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Choice of Law for Burdens of Proof
Dale A. Nance †
ABSTRACT: The traditional view is that all aspects of the burden
of proof are procedural, so a forum court properly employs its
own law on such matters, even when comity dictates the
application of another jurisdiction’s substantive law to the matter
in dispute. However, this has never been an entirely accurate
description of practice, and there has been discernible movement
toward the opposite conclusion over the last century. The matter
remains in flux, with divergent judicial opinions and unhelpful
rationalizations. This Article explains the discord and provides a
workable rule for resolving the choice-of-law problem. The key
is to recognize that the two components of the burden of proof,
the burden of persuasion and the burden of production, have quite
different functions. Once these functions are identified, it
becomes clear that the burden of production, in both its allocation
and the severity of the burden that it imposes, should be governed
by forum law. But the burden of persuasion, in both its allocation
and the severity of the burden that it imposes, should be taken
from the jurisdiction the substantive law of which the forum court
chooses to apply, whenever that burden regulates the fact-finder’s
inferences about an ultimate material fact. Moreover, in this
context, allowing judicial discretion to modify these principles by
attempting to take non-forum state purposes or interests into
account is unnecessary and likely counter-productive.
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I. Introduction
Suppose a court is faced with a choice-of-law problem, and this
“forum” court chooses to apply the substantive law of a foreign state
on a particular issue. What law controls the burden of proof
regarding the ultimate factual issues specified by the foreign law?
The authorities contain no clear answer to this question, in part
because it is actually many questions. Several tests have been
suggested over the years, but nothing coherent has attained general
acceptance. The purpose of this Article is to suggest an
improvement in the criteria used to determine such choices.
Despite the enormous diversity of modern American approaches
to choice-of-law problems, 1 there is one persistent feature of the
present discussion. Even when interstate or international contacts
necessitate a choice among sources of controlling substantive law,
courts almost invariably ascribe to the proposition that local law of

1 See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW
REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006).
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procedure is to be employed. 2 It seems obvious that an American
court should not attempt to replicate the entire Austrian system of
litigation, merely because the legal force of an agreement between
the parties is properly governed by Austrian contract law. As a
consequence, the substance/procedure distinction continues to have
life, despite long standing academic criticism of it and regardless of
the general approach to conflict of laws used by the forum court. 3
One of the most puzzling subjects in this regard is the present
topic, choices regarding various aspects of the burden of proof on
the merits at trial. Burdens of proof are legal tools that inhabit the
borderland of the substance/procedure distinction. The first
conflict-of-laws Restatement (published in 1934) articulates the
unequivocal rule that all procedural matters are governed by forum
law, and nominally places all issues regarding the burden of proof
on the procedural side of the dichotomy. 4 However, in an attempt
to reflect divergent case law, the first Restatement’s comments
allow a way to characterize (or re-characterize) a burden of proof
rule as substantive. A court can do this by determining that the
foreign law that governs the parties’ rights and the foreign burden
of proof rule related to it “are so bound together that the application
of the corresponding proof rule of the forum would seriously alter
the effect of the operative facts under the law of the appropriate

2 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (A.L.I. 1934);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 6 (“Procedure”) (A.L.I. 1971). Even
those jurisdictions that do not follow either Restatement generally respect this distinction.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1998) (“In conflicts cases
involving procedural matters, Pennsylvania will apply its own procedural laws when it is
serving as the forum state. In cases where the substantive laws of Pennsylvania conflict
with those of a sister state in the civil context, Pennsylvania courts take a flexible approach
which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before
the court.”); see also Tanges v. Heidelberg North America, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 250, 251-52,
255 (N.Y. 1999) (drawing analogous distinction).
3 See generally RICHARD GARNETT, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
4 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595 (A.L.I. 1934). For matters of
substantive law, the first Restatement reflects the traditional view that the forum court
should select the law of the jurisdiction where a specific event occurred (like the last event
necessary to produce the alleged cause of action) or where a certain status requirement was
satisfied (like the place where physical property was located), the particular test being
determined by the nature of the lawsuit (breach of contract, tort, recovery of property, etc.).
See ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 54 (6th ed.
2011).
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foreign state.” 5 The main problem with this approach is that,
depending on the meaning attributed to “operative facts,” every
burden of proof rule either cannot or inevitably does “alter the effect
of the operative facts,” making the exception incoherent. 6 In
addition, it is plausible to assume that all statutes or common-law
rules are promulgated in contemplation of the applicable burden of
proof rules, which would therefore be no less “inextricably bound”
with them. 7 So, in order to make this test usable, the cases
supposedly following this approach tend to focus on whether the
foreign burden of proof rules were adopted in connection with, or
with specific reference to, a statutory alteration of rules of liability. 8
In the end, however, that limitation is strikingly under-inclusive:
some leading cases choosing non-forum proof rules simply cannot
be explained on this basis. 9

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1934).
The obvious meaning of the phrase “operative facts” is the ultimate material facts
that the law makes determinative. But the effect of such facts (i.e., once taken as facts)
cannot be altered by a proof rule, as the role of such rules is exhausted in the determination
whether or not to accept those facts as true. Alternatively, the phrase “operative facts”
might have been intended to refer to the fact that certain evidence is presented or to facts
inferred from the evidence that nonetheless fall short of the ultimate facts. See WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 32-35 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923)
(distinguishing between “operative” facts and “evidential” facts). But in the latter case, the
very point of such proof rules is to regulate the effect of (i.e., the inferences drawn from)
such evidence. Cf. Edmund M. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 153, 185 (1944) (arguing that the cases in which the burden of proof is inextricably
bound together with the substantive right “constitute either all or none of the litigated
cases”).
7 The Supreme Court made this argument, well before the Restatement was issued,
in the course of holding that the Federal Employer Liability Act—which was silent on the
question of the burden of proof—took for granted the extant federal common-law
allocations of the burden of persuasion, even when the matter is litigated in state court. See
Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1915) (holding that state courts
must employ federal burden allocation in such cases).
8 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Int’l Ry., 169 N.E. 112, 115 (N.Y. 1929) (choosing
Ontario’s burden of proof rule for its statutory comparative negligence scheme, allocating
the burden of proving contributory negligence to the defendant, over forum’s rule that
plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence).
9 See, e.g., Redick v. M.B. Thomas Auto Sales, 273 S.W.2d 228, 232-35 (Mo. 1954)
(applying non-forum state’s general rule placing the burden of proving due care on the
plaintiff, rather than forum’s general rule placing the burden of proving the plaintiff’s
negligence on the defendant); Precourt v. Driscoll, 157 A. 525, 526-29 (N.H. 1931) (to
same effect).
5
6
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The second Restatement, published in 1971, is somewhat
different. Rather than burying the “escape clause” in the comments,
it places it squarely in the rule itself. Instead of making the
applicability of the escape depend on whether the alternative rules
would “seriously alter” the results, the determination depends on the
purpose of the foreign state’s proof rule. Specifically, the foreign
proof rule should be selected only when the “primary purpose” of
that rule “is to affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the
conduct of the trial.” 10 The obvious problem with this approach,
aside from the usual difficulties in determining the primary purpose
of a rule, is that the Restatement does not give any meaningful
guidance about how to differentiate between the two purposes.
What exactly is the difference between a purpose “to affect the
decision” and one “to regulate the conduct of the trial”? Any proof
rule that regulates the conduct of the trial can affect the decision and
presumably the authors of the rule contemplate that effect.
Conversely, any proof rule that affects the decision inevitably
regulates the conduct of the trial, and presumably, the authors of
such a rule contemplate that regulatory impact. On close inspection,
the category of rules whose primary purpose is to affect the decision
and that of rules whose primary purpose is to regulate the conduct
of the trial, are not mutually exclusive. 11 As a result, cases
following this approach can be explained by reference to the
indicated distinction only because, like the first Restatement test, it
is often practically indeterminate, allowing nearly any decision
selecting a burden of proof rule to be explained by reference to it. 12
Is there a better way to articulate the difference that the courts
whose rationales are reflected in the Restatements have sought to
identify? If so, can one use such an understanding to identify certain
aspects of proof rules that should be governed by forum law and
others that should be governed by the law of the jurisdiction
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 133-34 (A.L.I. 1971). For
matters of substantive law (and, in theory, for matters of procedure) the second
Restatement—developed in the wake of major changes in choice-of-law theory—generally
adopts the approach of identifying the law of the state with the most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties, although the analysis is complicated by numerous
presumptive or default rules as well as references to general principles of selection. See
FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 59.
11 See infra Section II.
12 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 349 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013)
(criticizing both Restatements for articulating easily manipulable criteria).
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providing the indisputably substantive rules of decision? In this
Article, I suggest answers to these questions. The proposed answers
depend on differentiating between two distinct kinds of
contemplated effects on the outcome of the trial.
First, a proof rule can express a preference for one side of the
dispute over the other in regard to the decision on the merits. This,
is the function associated with setting and allocating the standard of
proof for the case, such as proof by a “preponderance of the
evidence,” proof by “clear and convincing evidence,” or proof
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” 13 This standard and its allocation
together constitute what is usually called the “burden of
persuasion.” 14 Given the importance of uncertainty in cases that go
to trial, this kind of proof rule—inevitably prescribed for a
designated class of claims or defenses—is important in giving
meaningful content to the substantive law that will be applied,
because it distributes the risk of error between the parties.
Accordingly, it is reasonable, if not essential, for it to be governed
by the law of the state providing the substantive law. This is the
good sense that lies within the idea of a rule the primary purpose of
which is, in the language of the second Restatement, “to affect the
decision.”
Second, a proof rule can function as part of the law’s judgment
about how best to reach a compromise among the various competing
procedural goals of an adjudicative system. The most basic of these,
and arguably the most important in this context, are maximal
accuracy of decision and minimal adjudicative cost. The “burden
of producing evidence,” 15 (or more simply, the “burden of
production”) refers to a set of rules imbedded in this compromise.
Importantly, improving accuracy—which certainly affects the
decision and is intended to do so—is not the same thing as allocating
the risk of error: improved accuracy is important without regard to
See id. §§ 339-41.
See, e.g., id. There are other kinds of rules that can be part of the burden of
persuasion. In particular, corroboration rules and rules requiring the testimony of more
than one witness to prove some fact can change the effective burden of persuasion,
provided the fact-finder is required to credit the corroborating testimony or additional
witnesses. There is a long tradition of such “quantitative” requirements on proof in RomanCanon law. See generally MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE: PRE-MODERN
AND MODERN APPROACHES (2019). There are few such rules in modern American law. The
issues raised by them are discussed infra Section V.B.
15 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 338.
13
14
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the party that may be benefited by the improvement. However,
improving accuracy generally comes at a cost. Inevitably, a legal
system must decide, explicitly or implicitly, how much in terms of
social resources of various kinds should be expended on improving
the accuracy of decisions. 16 Each jurisdiction must answer that
question for itself, and the forum’s answer is entitled to be respected
by its courts even when applying foreign law.
This suggests a relatively simple distinguishing principle: the
controlling non-forum law should include those rules specifying the
burden of persuasion on the ultimately controlling facts specified by
that law, while forum law should be chosen for those rules
regulating the burden of production. 17 This thesis is elaborated and
defended in the following sections. Section I provides necessary
background on the substance/procedure distinction and how it has
affected choice of law for burdens of proof. Section II identifies
procedural goals that can give meaning to the notion of procedural
neutrality. Section III relates this notion of procedural neutrality to
the typical functions of proof burdens, establishing the basic
contours of the suggested choice-of-law rule. Section IV tests the
resulting theory by taking a closer look at the second Restatement’s
provisions regarding burdens of proof and the case law that it
reflects. Section V addresses complications that arise when a stated
or inferred purpose or rationale does not match the standard function
16 Regulations of the burden of production address the practical optimization of
evidential “weight,” where that idea is understood, not in the way that lawyers usually
understand it, but rather in much the way that Keynes understood it. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 71-78 (1921). Whereas lawyers usually think of the
weight of evidence in the between-party comparative sense (i.e., which party’s evidence
“outweighs” the other), Keynes observed that there is a sense of weight that relates to total
amount and quality of evidence considered, regardless of which side presents it or which
side it favors. As a critical part of decision-making under uncertainty, attention to
Keynesian weight addresses the extent to which potential evidence has been developed, a
consideration that analytically precedes, and is largely independent of, another question
posed to the decision-maker, viz., which side of the dispute is favored by the evidence that
is available to the decision-maker when a decision must be made. For a detailed
examination of Keynes’s notion of weight and its use in the legal context, see DALE A.
NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND
TENACITY OF BELIEF (2016).
17 Burdens of proof on ancillary or preliminary issues that may arise during
litigation—such as the validity of service of process, the jurisdiction of the court, and
choice of law—are governed by forum law. See GARNETT, supra note 3, at 200. The
justification is straightforward: the only rules the application of which are regulated by
such burdens are themselves governed by forum law.
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of a burden of proof rule, argues that the latter is the better focus of
a choice-of-law rule, and considers the question whether the
proposed rule should be unqualified or subject to an “escape” clause
that would allow the forum court to go behind the rule’s standard
function to examine the “real” purpose of the proof rule. Section
VI briefly notes the significance of comparable norms that exist in
other countries as well as other contexts in this country where a
court must make a choice of law regarding burdens of proof.
II. The Substance/Procedure Distinction and Choice of Law
A. Preliminary Observations
The substance/procedure distinction is contestable and thus
manipulable. 18 Indeed, some judicial opinions use the distinction as
dressing for a conclusion, rather than as an analytical tool. Given
the general principle that procedural issues are governed by the rules
of the forum, and presented a choice between rules that could be
characterized as either substantive or procedural, a court that wants
to subject the issue to the forum’s regulation might ostensibly
reason that a particular rule is procedural and thus is governed by
forum law. 19 Such reasoning has the virtue of keeping the formal
distinction intact, because it is unnecessary to recognize an
exception to the formal principle or to create a new category in order
to achieve the court’s immediate goal. But it is then devoid of real
content. It does not explain why the specific rule in question should
be governed by forum law. 20
Moreover, many courts have made the mistake of thinking that

18 Compare Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 336-37 (1933) (arguing against the meaningfulness of the
distinction if taken as context invariant), with D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and
“Procedure” Revisited: With Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of
“Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 199-202, 206-07 (1982) (defending
the coherence of the distinction, despite its complexity).
19 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 65.
20 See, e.g., Levy v. Steiger, 124 N.E. 477 (Mass. 1919) (applying the forum
Massachusetts rule placing the burden to prove the plaintiff’s contributory negligence on
the defendant, rather than the Rhode Island rule placing the burden of proving absence of
contributory negligence on the plaintiff, even though Rhode Island tort law applied to the
accident). The court may well have believed that the Massachusetts rule was unequivocally
superior, but instead of refusing to apply the Rhode Island rule on such a “public policy”
basis, it was simpler and seemingly more rule-bound to invoke the idea that the burden of
proof is procedural.
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what is procedural for the purpose of one kind of decision is,
therefore, procedural for the purpose of another kind of decision.
Thus, courts have reasoned that a certain forum proof rule should
be selected because it had previously been considered procedural
when the question was not choice of law, but rather the retroactive
application of a rule when announced. 21 There is no obvious reason
to conclude that what is considered procedural for purposes of a
retroactivity analysis must be considered procedural for the purpose
of a choice-of-law analysis. Warnings to avoid such simplistic
reasoning have come from numerous sources, including the U.S.
Supreme Court and the drafters of the second Restatement. 22
Nonetheless, the allure of the idea that the scope of legal concepts
is context-independent persists, and some American courts continue
to fall prey to it, including courts addressing choice of law for
burdens of proof. 23
Difficulties with the substance/procedure distinction arise in
part from the fact that the distinction is a relative one, in the sense
that rule Y can be “procedural” relative to rule X, but at the same
time “substantive” relative to rule Z. Consequently, whether rule Y
is substantive or procedural depends on the rule with which one is
comparing it. Consider one articulation of the distinction, still
stated in some cases, which seems to reflect a simple dichotomy:
“[s]ubstantive law prescribes duties and rights and procedural law
concerns the means and methods to apply and enforce those duties
and rights.” 24 Reflection on the nature of legal obligations reveals

21 See, e.g., id. (relying on a prior Massachusetts decision addressing the
constitutionality of a statute placing the burden to prove contributory negligence on the
defendant).
22 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“‘[S]ubstance’ and
‘procedure’ are the same key-words to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor
‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending
upon the particular problem for which it is used.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (A.L.I. 1971).
23 See, e.g., Shaps v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 826 So. 2d 250, 254 (Fla.
2002) (relying on procedural characterization of burden allocation in forum’s retroactivity
decisions in making a choice of law regarding the burden of proof); see also Babcock v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 404 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (characterizing the
allocation of the burden as procedural by relying on a procedural characterization of the
burden allocation in the non-forum’s decisions regarding retroactivity and the scope of
judicial authority to change the allocation).
24 Shaps, 826 So. 2d at 254 (quoting Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d
1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994)).
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that, by such a criterion, it would be better to describe the situation
as involving a spectrum from the most substantive to the most
procedural. To illustrate the point, here is a simplified list of legal
rights and duties, articulated in the context of a cause of action for
the negligent infliction of physical harm. The reader is invited to
decide at what point in this list one has passed from “substance” to
“procedure.”
1. A owes B a duty not to expose B to an unreasonable risk of
physical harm.
2. If A breaches the duty in “1,” and thereby causes harm to B, A
has a duty to compensate B for the harm.
3. B has a power to invoke a court’s authority to determine
whether A breached the duty in “1” without properly
compensating B, as required in “2.” If so, the court may award a
judgment for B, affirming the duty to compensate; various rules
regulate how this is done.
4. If a court gives a monetary award against A in the claim
adjudicated in “3,” so that A incurs a judgment-confirmed duty to
pay the monetary award, but A does not compensate B
accordingly, then B has a power to invoke a court’s authority to
seize A’s property in satisfaction of the award, according to
various rules that determine whether, how, and when A’s property
may be used to discharge A’s judgment debt to B.

By the articulation of the substance/procedure distinction quoted
above, each level of this juridical scheme can be called procedural
relative to those that go before it and substantive relative to those
that follow it. After the first, each level concerns “the means and
methods to apply and enforce duties and rights” that have been
recognized at a previous level. 25
In the face of this conceptual complexity, if one is to insist on a
dichotomy rather than a spectrum, and if one wants to limit what is
considered substantive, then one may be inclined draw the line high
on the analogous list for the case under consideration. Conversely,
if one wants to broaden the notion of what is substantive, one may
be inclined to draw the line low on the list. Examples of extreme
25 It is universally accepted that issues arising at “1” are potentially subject to an
appropriate choice of non-forum law: these are quintessentially substantive rights and
duties. At the same time, issues arising at “4” are consistently subject only to forum law.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 600 (A.L.I. 1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 131 (A.L.I. 1971). The more difficult issues arise at “2”
and “3.”
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positions, especially pertinent to the present topic, are given below.
B. The Right/Remedy Confusion
For a long time, English courts resisted the idea of enforcing the
law of another country, and when they finally did so in the
eighteenth century, they drew the line between “1” and “2.”
Identifying the substance/procedure distinction with what is
actually the right/remedy distinction had the effect of placing any
rule that specifies or determines one’s remedy for a breach of duty
in the “procedure” bailiwick. 26 It is uncommon today for courts to
identify the substance/procedure distinction with this right/remedy
distinction. In particular, rules regarding the availability and proper
measures of damages, injunctive relief, and other remedies are
largely subject to the possible selection of non-forum law. 27 But
obviously, that does not end the controversy. Drawing the
substance/procedure cut-off line between “2” and “3” is
theoretically plausible, as it marks off the point at which the judicial
process becomes involved. 28 American courts that do this in the
course of holding that all burden of proof rules on the merits of a
claim are governed by forum law may thereby resolve the choiceof-law issue by fiat, controlling for that jurisdiction. But they
nonetheless present obvious targets of criticism. 29
26 See Risinger, supra note 18, at 190-203. Beale tried to avoid this difficulty by
using the term “secondary rights” for those specified in “2” and reserving the term
“remedial rights” for those specified in “3” and “4.” See JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-89 (1916).
27 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 372, 412, 421, 606
(A.L.I. 1934) (choosing lex loci to govern the measure of damages in various contexts,
except when a statute of the forum specifically mandates otherwise); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 171, 207 (A.L.I. 1971) (stating choice-of-law
provisions for damages in tort and for breach of contract do not treat remedies as
procedural). See generally GARNETT, supra note 3, 295-360 (providing a detailed choiceof-law treatment of remedies, including injunctions, in common-law and civil-law
jurisdictions).
28 See JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 495-96 (7th ed. 1924).
29 In his classic article, professor Morgan drew the theoretical line between substance
and procedure at the move from “2” to “3.” Morgan, supra note 6, at 154 n.4. His emphasis
was on the fact-finding aspect of procedural rules: “[I]t seems obvious that rules which
declare legal relations when all relevant facts are treated as known because assumed or
proved are different, not in degree but in kind, from those which deal only with the
methods, means and machinery for making them known.” Id. Yet, he rightly insisted that
drawing the substance/procedure line there should not end the conflict-of-laws analysis.
See id. at 153-58.
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For example, in the well-known 1919 case of Levy v. Steiger, 30
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was required to
choose between the burden of proof allocation of the forum
(Massachusetts) and that of the state where the accident occurred
(Rhode Island). Rhode Island followed the common-law rule,
which placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff
exercised due care as well as the burden of proving that the
defendant did not. By statute, Massachusetts had modified the
common-law rule, placing the burden on the defendant to prove that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Using the traditional
right/remedy language, and identifying it with the
substance/procedure distinction, the court held that the forum rule
applied. 31 Even if one ignores the right/remedy confusion and treats
the decision as drawing a line between “2” and “3,” the reasoning is
rightly criticized as simplistic, avoiding any thought to choice-oflaw policies. The court made no attempt to explain why the burden
of proof ought to be considered procedural for choice-of-law
purposes. And the result is plausibly criticized as creating an
unacceptable incentive for plaintiffs in such cases to seek
jurisdiction in Massachusetts. 32 Especially under the traditional
choice-of-law theory then applied by the Massachusetts court—a
territorial selection of governing substantive law based on where
events occurred, in this case the law of the place where the wrong
occurred (lex loci delicti)—was intended to insure uniformity of
result regardless of where the action was brought. 33
C. Vertical Choice of Law: The Impact of Erie
The Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 34
Levy v. Steiger, 124 N.E. 477 (Mass. 1919).
See id. at 477. Similar reasoning is used in other early twentieth-century decisions.
See, e.g., Chi. Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg, 73 N.E. 990, 996 (Ind. 1905) (“The
statute in question pertains merely to the remedy, and controls in all actions like this when
prosecuted in the courts of this state, regardless of the fact that the right of action may have
arisen in another jurisdiction.”); Jenkins v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 145 N.W. 40, 42
(Minn. 1914) (“Error is assigned because the court charged that defendant had the burden
of proving contributory negligence. Such is claimed to be contrary to the law of Iowa,
where the accident occurred . . . . [B]urden of proof pertains to the remedy, and is
controlled by the rule in this state.”).
32 See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 63-65 (6th
ed. 2010).
33 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 54.
34 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30
31
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introduced a new “vertical choice of law” regime: when federal
district courts hear claims not based on federal statutory or
constitutional law—for example, claims in which federal
jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship—the federal
court must use rules of decision as close as possible to those of the
state where the federal court is located. 35 To be sure, the federal
courts have never thought that Erie required them to use all the
procedural rules of the state in which they sit. But, in cases where
the federal court is required to decide whether to apply federal or
state rules that might be characterized as either substantive or
procedural, a high priority is assuring that the parties’ selection of
the federal court instead of the state court does not substantially
affect the anticipated result in the case. If it does, then that fact
would give rise to an unacceptable degree of inequality of treatment
for litigants and associated forum shopping. 36 Although the
Supreme Court case law is hardly a model of clarity, 37 it has led to
a very broad conception of what is substantive in this context, or at
least what is to be taken together with what is undeniable
substantive, extending to many issues that arise only at “3”. 38 In
35 Id. at 78 (seemingly limiting the holding, however, to matters of “substantive”
law). Because of this aspiration to near parity in result, the federal court must apply the
conflict-of-laws principles of the state where the federal court sits rather than independent
federal conflicts principles. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97
(1941). This is in stark contrast with the horizontal choice-of-law principle, universally
followed with but few exceptions, that the forum court applies its own state’s conflict-oflaws principles, not those of another state. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 5-8 (A.L.I. 1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 4-5, 7-8
(A.L.I. 1971).
36 There is one obvious exception. Federal diversity jurisdiction was premised on the
idea that the option to be in federal court would provide the out-of-state litigant some
assurance of fair treatment, and that itself is an anticipated effect on the outcome of the
case. Accordingly, it must be considered desirable that a foreign litigant would engage in
forum selection in order to avoid local bias. On rare occasions, such bias in favor of a local
citizen might be reflected in a valid legal rule as to which the federal court might be called
upon to make a vertical choice of law, and in such a case the federal court should reject
the state rule even though doing so likely will affect the outcome of the case and contribute
to forum-shopping. See, e.g., LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE
295-99 (1991) (describing nineteenth century federal decisions that can be so understood).
37 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, §§ 106-107.
38 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Human., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996) (holding
that the state rule governing judicial review of jury damages awards for excessiveness
applies, rather than the federal common-law rule). The principal exceptions—rules on
arguably procedural matters as to which the federal courts will not defer to state law despite
a likely effect on the outcome—are those in or derived from an explicit federal statute,

248

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

particular, notwithstanding the traditional “horizontal” choice-oflaw principle that burden of proof rules are governed by forum law,
federal courts have consistently held that most burden of proof rules
are substantive for vertical choice-of-law purposes and should be
governed by the relevant state law, or at least should be governed
by state law whether or not they are characterized as substantive. 39
Under the influence of the Erie doctrine, a major theme in
American horizontal choice-of-law scholarship has been to push for
an expansive accommodation of non-forum law. 40 Some have even
suggested roughly equating the substance/procedure distinction for
these two choice contexts. 41 However, these suggestions have not
been embraced by either federal or state courts making horizontal
choice-of-law decisions. In fact, when federal courts that must
make a vertical choice-of-law decision turn to any horizontal
choice-of-law issue that also must be addressed, they are usually

such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, see, for
example, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (holding that federal rules of civil
procedure control in federal courts adjudicating state law claims), or by important federal
policies such as those supported by an explicit provision of the federal Constitution, see,
for example, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958)
(holding parties’ right to a jury trial applied in federal diversity jurisdiction cases).
39 See, e.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210 (1939) (holding that,
under Erie, the allocation of the burden of persuasion is governed by state law); Burt Rigid
Box v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying state standard
of proof regarding proof of lost insurance policy). The same holds for presumptions that
shift the burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437,
446 (1959) (holding applicable, under Erie, a state presumption shifting to the life
insurance company the burden of persuasion that the insured committed suicide). Congress
has seemingly extended this to all rebuttable presumptions on the merits, whether they
shift the burden of persuasion or only the burden of production. See FED. R. EVID. 302 (“In
a civil case, state law governs the effect of a presumption regarding a claim or defense for
which state law supplies the rule of decision.”). Whether state law governs even with
respect to (non-presumption) sufficiency rules—rules that either preclude a trial judge
from, or require a trial judge to, direct a verdict in the context of a given allocation and
standard of proof—is a matter on which federal courts remain split. See infra notes 15156 and accompanying text.
40 The idea goes back at least to Professor Morgan. See Morgan, supra note 6, at 194
(“The desirability of securing identity of result in whatever forum the controversy is tried
ought to be controlling except where the judicial machinery cannot effectively be operated
to that end.”). Some modern treatises continue this theme. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra
note 32, § 3.2C1.
41 See, e.g., Robert Allen Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813 (1962); see also 2 MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 349.
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careful not to equate what is procedural for vertical choice-of-law
purposes with what is procedural for horizontal choice-of-law
purposes. 42 In the latter context, the legitimate interest in achieving
substantial identity of result between the courts of two states, and
thereby avoiding forum shopping, is a much less dominant
concern. 43 Indeed, the diversity of choice-of-law methodologies
found in the United States today makes “horizontal” forum
shopping unavoidable to a considerable extent. 44 Extending the
prevailing expansive accommodation of non-forum law from the
vertical choice-of-law context into the horizontal choice-of-law
context would allow the federalism tail to wag the privateinternational-law dog. 45
This Article’s suggested approach to the horizontal choice-oflaw problem rejects the nominal traditional solution—i.e., treating
all rules concerning the burden of proof as procedural and so
governed by forum law—and also rejects the extension of the
prevailing vertical choice-of-law solution to horizontal choices—
42 One of the leading cases addressing the burden of proof illustrates this nicely. See
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940)
(holding that, when a federal court adjudicates state law claims, the burden of proof is
governed by state law, but the traditional horizontal state choice-of-law rule then employed
by Massachusetts considered burden of proof procedural, so that the federal court sitting
in Massachusetts had to apply the Massachusetts burden of proof rule even when
adjudicating rights arising under the tort law of Maine, where the accident giving rise to
the action occurred).
43 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 65 (“[I]t would be as great a mistake to
import the Erie-Guaranty Trust outcome determinative test wholesale into the area of
horizontal conflict of laws as it was to engage in the mechanical classification of rules as
substantive or procedural under the vested rights system.”); see also SYMEONIDES, supra
note 1, at 389-94 (describing the increased modern focus on protecting forum state interests
as compared to assuring interstate uniformity).
44 Modern analytical approaches to horizontal choice of law have a discernible
preference for forum law. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:
An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 365-67 (1992). The greater this effect,
the more tempting is forum shopping.
45 As one scholar puts it:
Erie concerns arise primarily in the context of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
where the federal court is acting as a neutral arbiter of claims that otherwise would
be litigated in state court. In this instance, federal courts are much more concerned
with mimicking what would occur in an unbiased state forum. This concern is not
crucial to the horizontal choice of law inquiry—which is more oriented toward
whether there are compelling reasons not to apply forum state law.
LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 730 (Wolters
Kluwer 2d ed. 2018) (footnote omitted).
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i.e., treating all (or nearly all) burden of proof rules as substantive,
or at least choosing them together with the undeniably substantive
law to which they pertain. The proposed solution is based on an
analysis of burden of proof rules themselves and the functions that
they serve. This produces a different categorical distinction, rather
than relying on ad hoc choices made by each forum court
considering the choice-of-law factors that seem relevant. The
following discussion explains that categorical distinction and then
considers whether it would be wise to complicate a simple rule
based on it by incorporating an escape clause, like those appearing
in the Restatements. The starting point for this strategy is to identify
the procedural goals that are reflected in rules regarding the burden
of proof.
III. Procedural Goals as Distinctive
While the second Restatement and the case law it reflects are
unsuccessful in articulating a coherent principle of horizontal choice
of law regarding burdens of proof, the second Restatement’s more
general statements regarding the substance/procedure distinction
represent an improvement over the first Restatement and the more
traditional case law it reflects. Although Chapter 6 of the second
Restatement is entitled “Procedure,” the principal rule, § 122,
wisely avoids that term. It states that “[a] court usually applies its
own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted
even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve
other issues in the case.” 46 The key phrase, “how litigation shall be
conducted,” points to a nexus of considerations that each
jurisdiction must face in constructing and managing a system of
adjudication.
Unfortunately, the second Restatement does not identify these
considerations, either in its rules or its comments. The drafters’
comment on § 122 simply states that the forum has “compelling
reasons” to apply its own rules about how litigation is conducted. 47
They observe that “[t]he forum is more concerned with how its
judicial machinery functions and how its court processes are

46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (A.L.I. 1971); id. cmt. b
(“[T]he rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as ‘procedural’ or
‘substantive.’ Instead, they face directly the question whether the forum’s rule should be
applied.”).
47 Id. cmt. a.
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administered than is any other state.” 48 But the only reason given
for such concern is the inconvenience of mastering the rules of a
non-forum state: “[t]he difficulties involved in doing so would not
be repaid by a furtherance of the values that the application of
another state’s local law is designed to promote.” 49 That makes the
competing concern, that which limits an expansive application of
non-forum law, sound as if it were little more than avoiding too
much annoyance of the forum judges and the lawyers appearing
before them. There is much more to it than that. 50
To be sure, the second Restatement does indicate some of the
rules that, in accord with its stated criterion, should be taken
primarily as reflecting procedural concerns. Thus, the Restatement
presents categorical rules selecting forum law for matters such as
“the proper form of action, service of process, pleading, rules of
discovery, mode of trial and execution and costs,” which are readily
characterized as “relating to judicial administration.” 51 But when it
comes to the burden of proof, the second Restatement is ambivalent:
“[o]ther issues, as, for example, which side bears the burden of
proof (see § 133) and which side bears the burden of going forward
with the evidence (see § 134), fall into a gray area between issues
relating primarily to judicial administration and those concerned
primarily with the rights and liabilities of the parties.” 52
Id.
Id.
50 See Sedler, supra note 41, at 822-24 (distinguishing inconvenience from
considerations of procedural policy and suggesting that forum courts have hesitated to
incorporate analytically procedural aspects of non-forum law that can materially affect the
result out of concerns about the forum’s procedural policy); cf. GARNETT, supra note 3, at
17-18 (criticizing the idea of “inconvenience” for its vagueness and consequent difficulty
of application and potential elasticity of meaning).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a.
52 Id. The Restatement’s drafters were not alone in this ambivalence. Another
commonly cited attempt to articulate a categorical choice-of-law distinction in the context
of the rules leading up to judgment at trial is the following: “[P]rocedural rules should be
classified as those which concern methods of presenting to a court the operative facts upon
which legal relations depend; substantive rules, those which concern the legal effect of
those facts after they have been established.” GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (3d ed. 1963). Whatever Stumberg meant by “operative facts,”
neither category he described covers rules that specify how the fact-finder is to determine
what facts are to be taken as proven. A party does not “present” the ultimate facts to the
fact-finder; a party presents evidence of those ultimate facts, from which the fact-finder
must infer the truth or falsity of the ultimate facts, and it is just here that burden of proof
rules come into the picture. See supra note 6.
48
49
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Unfortunately, the Restatement’s advice about how to handle this
“gray area” is not very helpful. 53
For present purposes, no exhaustive discourse about procedural
goals and associated procedural values is necessary. 54 The need for
burdens of proof, and thus the occasion for a choice of law regarding
them, presupposes that there is doubt about the material facts.
Adjudication must address that uncertainty. Moreover, such
uncertainty is not a static feature of adjudicated cases; it usually can
be reduced by investigation. 55 Yet fact-finding in general, and
investigation in particular, are time-consuming and expensive
activities. Thus, pervasively important are achieving accurate
results and controlling litigation costs, two goals that are often in
tension, 56 a tension that must be resolved by accommodating both.57
Beyond that, the value placed on litigant autonomy, as compared to
state control, also helps to inform the selection of a more adversarial
system of adjudication as compared to one more focused on active
judicial investigation. If a mode of procedure is chosen that allows
the parties to select and control what is presented to the tribunal,
additional rules of discovery, disclosure, and admissibility tend to
arise in order to regulate the parties’ presentations, again in an effort
to get acceptably accurate results at an acceptable cost. 58 Further, if
53 Aside from deferring to established precedent, especially when that might create
expectations by the transacting parties, the drafters suggest considering “whether the issue
is one whose resolution would be likely to affect the ultimate result of the case.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a. The problem remains: if it
did not have such potential, a party would be unlikely to raise it.
54 See generally PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (Klaus F. Röhl & Stefan Machura eds., 1997);
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
55 In addition to the instrumental value accuracy serves, by facilitating the
achievement of substantive policy goals, it also has value as an end in itself: we want our
verdicts to be truthful. Not surprisingly, the two goals are functionally related. Augmenting
the quantity and quality of relevant evidence has been shown both to decrease expected
error (increase expected certainty) and (as a consequence) to increase expected utility of
decision-making under uncertainty. See NANCE, supra note 16, at 111-17, 253-70.
56 Litigation rules reflecting mere “convention” show that they are not always in
tension. For example, it may not matter in any way whether court papers are filed on lettersized paper (8.5 in. x 11 in. in the U.S.) or on legal size paper (8.5 in. x 14 in.), but choosing
one or the other and sticking with it reduces litigation costs.
57 See Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Can., Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A
pure rule of evidence, like a pure rule of procedure, is concerned solely with accuracy and
economy in litigation and should therefore be tailored to the capacities and circumstances
of the particular judicial system . . . .”).
58 See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227
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the mode of fact-finding selected values the involvement of lay
persons as decision-makers, as in jury trials, rules must
accommodate a bifurcated trial court and the costs thereof. This
complex of considerations determines the procedural goals of a
system of adjudication. 59 Any particular legal system must reach an
accommodation of the tensions inherent in these goals and the
values that they represent. 60 It is that accommodation—not just the
time and energy of judges and counsel in grappling with foreign
law—that is entitled to be respected even when the forum court
chooses to apply the law of another state or country.
This brief analysis facilitates reconstructing the second
Restatement’s cryptic distinction between burden of proof rules
designed “to affect decision of the issue” and those designed “to
regulate the conduct of the trial.” 61 Only those foreign proof rules
designed to affect the decision in a certain way should be chosen
together with the associated foreign rules of tort, contract, and so
forth. These are proof rules designed to affect the decision by going
beyond merely specifying the system’s accommodations of
accuracy and litigation cost; party autonomy and state control; lay
participation and professional judgment; and so forth. These are
rules that try to affect the decision not by merely making it more
accurate, less expensive, or by making it more attuned to the
common sense of lay jurors. They are rules designed to specify the
degree to which the law favors a decision for one side of the dispute
(1988). Not all rules usually placed in these categories serve only or primarily such
functions. For example, privilege law affects admissibility but constitutes a part of the law
of privacy itself, and when a person consults a professional, for example, the
understandable expectations of confidentiality are usually a function of where the
communication takes place. This can rightly result in the application of non-forum law.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Tex. 1995) (applying the
second Restatement).
59 See generally MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale University Press 1986).
60 This accommodation is worked out by a process of evolution as much as it is a
product of explicit planning. Adjudicative systems are, to a significant extent,
spontaneously generated, adaptive orders. See Ronald J. Allen, Taming Complexity:
Rationality, the Law of Evidence and the Nature of the Legal System, 12 L., PROBABILITY
& RISK 99, 100-04 (2013). By some accounts, the resulting differences in procedural law
between countries are often greater than the differences in substantive law. See, e.g.,
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Introduction: The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately
Portable?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 649, 652 (1997).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 (A.L.I. 1971); see also,
supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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over the other, one (dispute-specific) class of litigants over
another. 62
Of course, to say that a rule “favors” one class of litigants is not
to say that it is inherently unfair, as there may be good reasons for
doing so. Indeed, that feature describes the difference between any
distinct substantive rules on the same subject. For example, if one
compares a regime of negligence liability for defective products to
a regime of strict liability for such products, the difference lies in
the extent to which the law favors recovery by plaintiffs who have
suffered harm. One solution may be better or more just than the
other, but neither can be criticized for merely expressing the law’s
policy judgments or preferences in that regard. Conversely, what
distinguishes true procedural rules is that they do not do this.
Some will object that all choices about rules of procedure favor
one side over the other, which means that all rules about the burden
of proof do as well. 63 Thus, my claim presupposes what some think
is an entirely elusive concept of procedural neutrality. To be sure,
putting aside choice-of-law questions, most choices of a procedural
rule have systemic effects of some kind, relative to the status quo
ante or to alternative rule choices, effects that in principle can be
identified and described as favoring one class of litigants over
another. Here, however, lies the significance of the second
Restatement’s reference to primary purpose. 64 Rule-makers can
62 In the Restatement, this idea perceptibly surfaces only in one of the illustrations
provided by the drafters. They considered the application of a statute interpreted by the
courts of state X, in which it was enacted, as placing the burden of persuasion on an
employer to prove that an injury to an employee occurring during the scope of employment
was not caused by the employer’s negligence. The drafters state: “This statute, as so
interpreted, will be applied in an action brought by [an employee] in a court in state Y to
recover for his injuries [in state X] if the Y court finds, as it probably will, that the X statute
was primarily designed to affect decision of the issue of the employer’s negligence in favor
of the injured employee.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133 illus. 5
(A.L.I. 1971) (emphasis added). But the drafters give no indication that it is just this kind
of effect on the decision that triggers deference to non-forum law.
63 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 875,
891-92 (2011) (illustrating this claim by reference to the effects of adopting a rule requiring
one size of paper instead of a rule adopting another size, and arguing that such choices do
have an effect on classes of litigants, even if it is a very small one). Professor Tidmarsh
does not specifically address the point of my example (see supra note 56), because he
considers the choice between one uniform size or another and thus ignores the main
practical question really encountered, namely, whether to have some uniform rule, a
convention, or else to allow parties to file on whatever size of paper they choose.
64 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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pursue neutral procedural goals even when the effort to do so has
potentially identifiable secondary effects that favor plaintiffs or
defendants or subclasses thereof. They might or might not be aware
of such effects when selecting a rule, and if they are aware, they
might or might not approve of such effects. However, in neither
case does that make such effects the primary purpose of the rule.
Thus, a rule adopted with the purpose of reducing litigation costs is
a rule in service of a neutral procedural goal. This remains the case
even though it may be true that, at least insofar as those costs are
private costs and are not disproportionately saved by defendants,
selecting that rule might make litigation more attractive and thus
favorable to potential plaintiffs. Similar comments pertain to
increasing accuracy of verdicts and to the other aspects of the
accommodation described above. 65
Not only does the phrase “to affect the decision of the issue”
sweep too broadly to identify only that which should be taken as
substantive for choice-of-law purposes, but the phrase “to regulate
the conduct of the trial” sweeps too broadly to identify only that
which should be taken as procedural for choice-of-law purposes. To
put a fine point on it, all burden of proof rules are designed to
regulate the conduct of the trial; one might call this their immediate
purpose. What differentiates them is what might be called their
intermediate purposes. Some burden of proof rules are intended to
regulate the conduct of the trial for the intermediate purpose of
65 Cf. Martin Illmer, Neutrality Matters—Some Thoughts About the Rome
Regulations and the So-Called Dichotomy of Substance and Procedure in European
Private International Law, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 237 (2009). In the context of the European
Union and choice-of-law rules for member states, Illmer draws a similar distinction
between rules merely “affecting the decision on the merits” and those “concerned with the
decision on the merits,” with only the latter being referred to the lex causae, potentially
the law of a non-forum state. Id. at 246. Unfortunately, he explains this distinction by
writing, “only those issues which are directed at the decision on the merits reached by the
court are concerned with that decision.” Id. (emphasis added). This suggests that a rule
“directed at the decision on the merits” must be non-neutral. Further, he writes,
“[n]eutrality is determined by the abstract nature of the matter in question, not by reference
to the concrete case.” Id. Abstraction, however, is not the key; rather, the key is whether
the rule is designed to adjust the law’s degree of preference for a result favorable to one
side rather than the other. The rules at issue invariably are articulated in abstract terms, so
as to apply to a range of cases, so the abstractness of the rule’s focus does not provide a
useful criterion. More importantly, rules designed to improve accuracy regardless of which
party or class of litigants is thereby favored are neutral procedural rules, a conflict about
which should be controlled by lex fori rather than lex causae, but they are certainly rules
that are both “concerned with” and “directed at” the decision on the merits.
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expressing the degree of preference for one class of litigants over
another in handling unresolved uncertainty. Some burden of proof
rules are intended to regulate the conduct of the trial for the
intermediate purpose of achieving a balance of procedural goals,
including the reduction of uncertainty before a decision must be
made. Neither of these purposes is ultimate, of course, as the
ultimate legitimate purpose of each is doing justice according to
law. It is with reference to these intermediate purposes that the
question meaningfully can be raised: Which is primary?
Unfortunately, this is not the way the Restatement articulates the
matter.
Of course, it is commonplace today to acknowledge that what
are usually understood as procedural rules can be adopted for
substantive purposes, and conversely substantive rules can be
adopted to pursue what are procedural goals. 66 These complications
are addressed later. 67 A more fundamental challenge to a distinction
based on the notion of procedural neutrality is presented by the
observation that substantive rights and liabilities are adopted with a
particular procedural framework in mind, so that any attempt to
separate one from the other in the choice-of-law context will result
in the distortion of the scheme contemplated by the promulgator of
the substantive rights and liabilities. 68 There is certainly truth in this
observation, 69 but the question is what to make of it. To some, it
suggests that a forum court that does not wholly reject the
application of the non-forum law should embrace as much of the
non-forum law as possible, regardless of its characterization as
substantive or procedural. 70 But this fails to take into account the
other side of the matter: not only can separating non-forum
substantive law from its associated (non-forum) procedures distort
the former, but failing to separate them can distort the procedural
goals of the forum state. So long as there are identifiable procedural
goals, and so long as the accommodations made among procedural
goals vary across jurisdictions, any decision by one state to apply
the law of another state will encounter this double-edged problem.
See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 18, at 204-11.
See infra Section V.
68 See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87
WASH. U.L. REV. 801, 802 (2010).
69 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70 See Main, supra note 68, at 830-37.
66
67
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The question is how practical lines can be drawn to minimize both
kinds of distortion. In the case of burdens of proof, I argue, this is
done by attending to the typical functions of distinct burdens.
IV. Choice of Law and the Functions of Proof Burdens
To make progress on choice-of-law questions regarding the
burden of proof, one must identify the distinct functions that are
served by rules regarding the burden of proof and how those
functions relate to substantive and procedural goals. In an
adversarial system, these functions are served by two distinct
aspects of the burden of proof, usually called the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production. 71 Each of these burdens
has two components: (1) rules allocating the burden between the
parties; and (2) rules specifying the “severity” of the burden so
allocated, that is, what and how much the burdened party must do
to meet the burden. 72
A. Functions of the Burdens of Proof
The burden of persuasion regulates the final decision of the trierof-fact, whether that is a jury or the trial judge in a bench trial. Its
two components are: rules specifying the strength of evidence (or
standard of proof) required to establish an ultimate question of fact;
and rules allocating the risk that the fact-finder will not be
persuaded one way or the other according to that prescribed
standard. The burden of persuasion is set by law, communicated to
jurors (if a jury is used) by way of jury instructions, and applied by
the fact-finder. 73
This burden reflects how the law chooses to allocate the risk of

71 See ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P. LEONARD, AVIVA A. ORENSTEIN, DALE A. NANCE,
& STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 2.02 (4th ed. 2018).
72 It is potentially more complicated than that. For example, if a verdict for the
plaintiff requires clear and convincing evidence that X is true, it is logically possible for
the risk of non-persuasion regarding X to be allocated either to the plaintiff or the
defendant. If “clear and convincing evidence that X” is interpreted as a probability of X
that is higher than some threshold like 0.67 (2:1 odds) or 0.75 (3:1 odds), then the factfinder must have a rule about which side wins if the fact-finder is unable to decide whether
or not that threshold has been surpassed. In principle, this risk of non-persuasion could be
assigned to the defendant. Nevertheless, invariably the risk of non-persuasion falls on the
party disfavored by such a heightened standard.
73 See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.03.
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error that has not been eliminated by the evidential process,
including discovery, the presentation of evidence, and the analysis
of that evidence. 74 For example, criminal cases have a high standard
of proof on most issues, in order to allocate the risk of error
disproportionately (though not completely) onto the prosecution.
Civil cases, on the other hand, generally treat the parties relatively
equally in this regard, on the theory that an error in favor of the
plaintiff is not significantly worse than an error in favor of the
defendant. 75 There are, however, some examples of “disfavored”
claims, usually where fraud or malice is alleged, for which a
heightened standard of proof applies, often called proof by “clear
and convincing evidence.” 76 In addition, whatever the standard of
proof selected, the allocation of the resulting burden establishes the
risk of non-persuasion: it prescribes which side wins when the factfinder is unable to resolve whether or not the standard of proof has
been surpassed. 77
The burden of production, on the other hand, regulates the
respective roles of the trial judge, the parties, and the fact-finder
with regard to the presentation and evaluation of evidence. 78 This
burden also has two components: rules that specify what is
sufficient or what is not sufficient to satisfy the burden; and rules
allocating the burden between the parties. Sometimes referred to as
the burden of producing evidence or the burden of going forward,
this burden comes into play when one party claims that the other
party has not offered sufficient evidence to merit continuing with
the case as to a particular issue or claim, so that the judge must grant
a motion for a preemptive determination at that point. 79 Of
74 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 16-42 (elaborating the risk-of-error understanding of
burdens of persuasion).
75 If the usual civil standard is interpreted as requiring proof on the balance of
probabilities, then choice of that standard also arguably serves a purely procedural goal,
namely accuracy, because decisions made on the balance of probability, minimize the
expected number of erroneous decisions. See David H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of
Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF
1, 6-13 (1999). This, however, is not the dominant relationship between proof burdens and
accuracy; the primary assurance of accuracy is the adequate development of the evidence,
a concern that underlies the burden of production. See NANCE, supra note 16, at 178-80.
76 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 340.
77 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 3-4 (commenting on factors considered in allocating
the burden).
78 See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.02.
79 See id.
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importance to choice of law considerations is the fact that the
burden of production works very differently in adversarial
adjudicative systems—where the parties are tasked to discover, sort,
and present evidence to the court—than it does in adjudicative
systems where parties do not have that role because magistrates
select what evidence to develop and consider. 80
Whereas the burden of persuasion rarely shifts from the party
initially burdened to the opponent and necessarily continues into the
fact-finder’s deliberation, the burden of production can shift during
the trial, and its force is usually expended in determining whether
the case is properly one for the fact-finder to determine. 81 For the
burden of production, there are a number of rules (rules of
“sufficiency”) determining the severity of the burden. 82 The most
conspicuous sufficiency rule is that, when a preemptive motion is
made at an appropriate point in the proceeding, 83 the evidence must
be strong enough to permit a reasonable fact-finder to find the
contested fact in favor of the non-moving party; otherwise, the court
will grant the preemptive motion and summarily determine that
particular fact. 84 Differences exist among jurisdictions about how
exactly this test is articulated and about the contours of subsidiary
rules.
For example, most states employ some version of the so-called
“single witness” rule: the testimony of a competent witness that the
witness observed an event occur in a certain way is usually
sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to infer that the event
occurred in that way. 85 Put differently, when the only issue that a
jury must decide is whether to believe a competent witness, the jury

80 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 187 (noting that in relatively non-adversarial
systems, where judicial magistrates have the responsibility of collecting evidence, the
burden of production is on the magistrate, and parties challenge the inadequacy of the
magistrate’s work by appeal).
81 See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, at 42-45.
82 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 338.
83 The name and timing of the procedural motion used to test the burden of
production varies: it can be by summary judgment motion, by a motion for a directed
verdict (or nonsuit), or (in the language of the federal courts) a motion for involuntary
dismissal (in bench trials) or for judgment as a matter of law (in jury trials). See, e.g., FED.
R. CIV. P. 41(b), 50(a). It can, however, also, be raised after a jury verdict by a motion for
a judgment non obstante veredicto. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
84 See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.06 at 45-46.
85 See id. at 48-49.
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is entitled to make that decision either way without judicial
interference. But there are differences among jurisdictions in how
this test is articulated and applied. 86 As another example, most
jurisdictions hold that a proponent who bears the burden of
production may not satisfy it by providing only the testimony of a
witness who denies that proposition. The proponent will not be
heard to argue that the jury should be free to disbelieve the witness
and thus find the proposition to be true; to do otherwise would
provide proponents bearing the burden of persuasion with a ready
vehicle for avoiding judicial oversight (namely, calling an adverse
witness). 87 Again, there is variation in how this principle is
applied. 88
Contrary to what has sometimes been asserted by conflicts
scholars, 89 such rules and rulings on the sufficiency of evidence do
much more than simply regulate the order in which the plaintiff and
defendant present their sides of the case, even when evidence is
readily available. They regulate the conduct of the judge, the
parties, and the fact-finder in a way that each jurisdiction considers
appropriate to improve accuracy, to efficiently terminate weak
cases, and, at the same time, to respect the role of lay juries when
they are involved. Take, for example, “permissive inference” rules,
like the single witness rule or (according to its usual interpretation)
res ipsa loquitur. 90 Why would such rules be thought necessary?
There are two main reasons. First, trial judges might be tempted to
take cases from juries that appellate courts or legislatures think
should be decided by juries. 91 In such cases, a permissive inference
86 Compare, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 411 (“Except where additional evidence is
required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is
sufficient for proof of any fact.” (emphasis supplied)); with Thompson v. City of Corsicana
Housing Auth., 57 S.W.3d 547, 555-58 (Tex. 1993) (holding that summary judgment may
not be based on the movant’s attack on the credibility of the non-movant’s witness). See
generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.11 (3d
ed. 1985).
87 See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1952).
88 See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.06 at 46-48.
89 See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 41, at 856 (asserting that the allocation of the burden
of production will not materially affect the outcome if evidence is readily available,
because “the burden merely ‘affects the order in which the plaintiff or defendant presents
his side of the case . . . .’” (quoting GEORGE W. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 156 (2d
ed. 1951))).
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 135 cmt. b (A.L.I. 1971).
91 The trial judge’s inclination might be based on doubts about the jury’s competence
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rule involves legislatures or appellate courts regulating the conduct
of trial judges. Second, because of the formal setting, jurors might
be tempted to think that it is their duty to be highly “technical,”
erroneously assuming, for example, that purely circumstantial
evidence is invariably inadequate. 92 In such cases, trial judges may
seek to “liberate” jury behavior by giving a permissive inference
jury instruction, in order to remind jurors not to leave their commonsense at home. 93 These are just the most obvious considerations.
Their perceived significance will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, depending on the nature and quality of jury pools and
of rules and local practices regarding discovery as well as litigant
and lawyer conduct.
Notice that monitoring judge/jury relations is not the only
concern of the rules that structure the burden of production, nor are
those concerns exhausted by including efficiency in regard to the
termination of meritless cases. One way to illustrate this is to
consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose that neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant presents any evidence, after which
the defendant moves for a directed verdict. If one thinks of the
burden of production rules as only eliminating cases where
reasonable jurors could not disagree, then this sort of case might or
might not be an appropriate case for a directed verdict. Whether
defendant’s motion should be granted would depend on whether
reasonable jurors could decide the case in favor of the plaintiff.
Tried cases tend to be close, and a variety of undisputed facts about

to address an issue, or on a party’s failure adequately to develop the evidence concerning
that issue, or simply on the prospect of wasting judicial resources when the jury’s proper
decision is obvious. Appellate courts or legislatures can weigh these considerations
differently, resulting in the intervention in the usual process that is the permissive inference
rule.
92 Of course, circumstantial evidence is often sufficient to support a verdict. See
PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.06 at 48.
93 On the importance of fact-finders’ background knowledge and beliefs in
understanding the evidence presented and the considerations relating to limits that might
be placed on jurors in this regard, see John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395
(1985). Of course, there is another possible explanation of the appearance of such
permissive inference rules in jury instructions: judicial confusion about roles. A rule
designed only to control the trial judge might be mistaken by the trial judge as a rule that
needs to be communicated to the jury. Such an instruction might still serve to liberate the
jury in the manner described in the text, or it might just be unnecessary verbiage that invites
an appeal by a losing party on the ground that it involves the judiciary improperly
encouraging a particular verdict by the jury.
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the case will have been communicated during jury selection and
other parts of the pre-trial process. 94 As a result, such a case might
be one on which reasonable jurors could decide in favor of the
plaintiff, certainly under the conventional preponderance of the
evidence standard. Yet, it is commonly understood that, in such a
case, the defendant’s motion would (and should) be granted,
regardless of what a reasonable jury might conclude about which
side is more likely to be in the right. 95 Why? Simply put, a case in
which no formal evidence is presented is a case for which the
evidence is unreasonably incomplete. It provides very little on
which the jury or even a judge can base its decision, when surely
more could be provided. 96 As this example suggests, courts have
used preemptive rulings against the party bearing the burden of
production as a means of insisting on the presentation of available
but missing evidence, even though it is rarely articulated in such
94 With regard to the plethora of undisputed facts that are communicated to jurors
prior to the calling of witnesses, see NANCE, supra note 16, at 95-101.
95 See, e.g., JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 86, § 7.7.
96 The example in the text may seem far-fetched. After all, why would there be no
evidence? One interesting example is provided by the famous case of Slade v. Morley, 76
Eng. Rpt. 1074 (K.B. 1602) (“Slade’s Case”). The case is known for its confirmation of
the use of the action of assumpsit to recover for breach of a wholly executory contract. Its
evidentiary posture has been succinctly described:
Slade, the plaintiff, alleged an unwritten contract between himself and the
defendant; there was a straightforward “your word against mine” situation, with
very little evidence on either side to weigh. Coke appeared for Slade, Bacon for
the defense. Hitherto, the defendant could normally win such a case by
compurgation, but Coke’s argument, ultimately accepted, was that a simple
matter of fact was at issue, so that a trial by jury was appropriate. Since English
law did not admit the parties as competent witnesses, the jury was effectively
being asked to decide the case on zero evidence.
JAMES FRANKLIN, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND PROBABILITY BEFORE
PASCAL 62 (2001). In fact, the plaintiff won the case with a jury verdict, which was
approved on appeal, and this is thought to have led to the passage of the English Statute of
Frauds. See, e.g., K.M. Teeven, Seventeenth Century Evidentiary Concerns and the Statute
of Frauds, 9 ADELAIDE L. REV. 252, 252 (1983). Of course, if the same case arose today,
the parties would be competent witnesses. See PARK ET AL, supra note 71, § 8.01. But that
does not necessarily mean that either would testify voluntarily, as is illustrated by the fact
that criminal defendants often choose not to testify; by testifying, a party becomes subject
to impeachment with evidence that often would not otherwise be admissible. See id., §
11.01. In such a setting, an anticipated risk of a directed verdict for the defense at the close
of the plaintiff’s case serves to require testimony for the plaintiff, and (given such
testimony) an anticipated risk of a directed verdict for the plaintiff at the close of the
defendant’s case serves to require testimony for the defendant. A similar dynamic would
apply if both parties were inclined to present unnecessarily meager evidence.
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terms. 97 When thus used, the point of improving the “weight” of the
evidence is that it increases the expected accuracy of the decision,
an epistemic good regardless of which side ultimately prevails. 98
So, the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
perform quite distinct functions. Yet this is easily overlooked. It is
easy to think of the burden of production as merely ancillary to the
burden of persuasion because of certain close connections between
the two. These connections, and the resulting confusions, will be
addressed in the context of considering the implications of the
foregoing insights for choice-of-law decisions.
B. Choice-of-Law Implications
1. The Burden of Persuasion
As described above, the burden of persuasion’s two components
express the law’s preference about which side should benefit from
the uncertainty that remains at the end of the assessment of the
evidence. If any aspects of the burden of proof should be governed
by the pertinent non-forum law, these are the best candidates. 99
Indeed, the substantive elements and their associated persuasion
burdens are so closely related that some courts fail to distinguish
between the two, calling a difference in what must be proved a
difference in “the burden of proof.” 100 Of course, a difference in
what must be proved does not entail a difference in who must prove
it or by what standard. Strictly speaking, the burden of persuasion
is the same for two jurisdictions when, to obtain relief in a certain
context, one of them requires the plaintiff to prove defendant’s
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence and the other
requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s malicious intent by a
97 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 201-12 (discussing illustrative cases and a variety of
arguments against understanding the burden of production in this way).
98 See supra note 55 (noting how augmenting relevant evidence contributes to both
the instrumental and intrinsic value of accuracy).
99 See Sedler, supra note 41, at 858 (noting that there is “no procedural policy of the
forum that is adversely affected if the locus’ burden of proof rule is used” by the forum).
See also Risinger, supra note 18, at 205-06 (identifying rules needed because of the lack
of omniscience of decision-makers and concluding that the burden of persuasion is a
theoretically procedural rule nonetheless “stemming from what is essentially a substantive
decision”).
100 See, e.g., Raskin v. Allison, 57 P.3d 30, 34 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (referring to a
difference between two jurisdictions in the elements that must be proved as a difference in
the “burden of proof”).

264

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, either kind of
difference—a difference in the elements that must be proved, or a
difference in the burden of persuasion for them—reflects the law’s
judgments about the manner or extent to which one class of litigants
should be favored as compared to opponents. 101
Section I included the reminder that it is dangerous to assume
that the line drawn between what is substantive and what is
procedural is context-independent. 102 It should not be assumed,
however, that how this distinction is to be drawn in one context is
wholly irrelevant to how it is to be drawn in another. After all, the
uses of the distinction bear important similarities, especially when
the contexts compared all involve choice-of-law decisions. In this
regard, it is important to observe that the United States Supreme
Court has consistently placed the burden of persuasion on one side
of this divide in various choice-of-law contexts. This was
mentioned above with regard to the Erie context. 103 The same is
true in so-called “reverse-Erie” cases, those in which state courts
adjudicate federal claims. 104
What is more, the same result obtains in choice-of-law contexts
where there is no comparable need to closely mirror the result of the
non-forum legal institution. For example, bankruptcy courts are
101 See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985) (reaffirming the
availability of punitive damages in tort cases, but limiting such to cases of malice—as
compared to the previously prevailing gross negligence standard—and requiring proof by
clear and convincing evidence of such malice—as opposed to the previously prevailing
preponderance of the evidence standard).
102 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Bank of America Nat. T. & S.
Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 32 (1956) (applying Erie principle to diversity jurisdiction
litigation between private parties involving alleged conversion of federal bonds even
though federal law controlled whether bonds were overdue, and holding that burden of
proof on good faith of defendants follows the controlling state law regarding conversion).
104 See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormick, 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942) (holding that a
state court adjudicating a federal admiralty claim must use the federal rules on allocation
and severity of the burden of persuasion regarding the validity of a release signed by the
plaintiff); Southern R. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632, 640 (1915) (applying, in case of loss
due to fire, federal common law to allocate the burden of persuasion on issue of carrier’s
negligence to the party alleging such negligence; holding that state law, which placed
burden on carrier/bailee to prove due care, did not apply, even though the trial of the issue
occurred in state court); Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1914)
(holding that the federal common-law burden, allocated to defendant, to prove contributory
negligence, controls in action brought in state courts to enforce liability under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act).
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specialized federal courts that address and manage the obligations
of insolvent debtors under federal law. Insofar as they must
determine the validity of debts arising under state law, however, the
issue can be presented whether state or federal burdens of proof
control. In Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 105 noting that
the basic federal rule in bankruptcy is that “state law governs the
substance of the claims,” 106 the Court held that any bankruptcy
practice placing the burden of persuasion on the creditor to show
the validity of a claim must yield to state tax law placing the burden
of persuasion regarding a tax claim on the taxpayer, represented by
the trustee in bankruptcy. 107 In the course of so holding, the Court
stated, “the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim
itself.” 108 As indicated in the precedents upon which the Court
relied, this somewhat paradoxical statement makes sense in that the
allocation of the burden of persuasion determines whether a given
ultimate material fact is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case or
rather part of an affirmative defense. 109
While such results seem correct, the Court’s reasoning begs the
question, for it does not explain why a particular fact’s being part of
the prima facie case, rather than an affirmative defense, is important
or determinative for choice-of-law purposes. 110 The Court’s
justification may nonetheless be based on a valid intuition that the
allocation and severity of the burden of persuasion have
considerable and generally contemplated effects on the strength of
the law’s expressed preferences between classes of litigants. Not
taking such rules into account can alter such preferences
significantly. This speaks not only to uniformity of decisions across

530 U.S. 15 (2000).
Id. at 20.
107 Id. at 26.
108 Id. at 21.
109 This is perhaps plainest in Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512
(1914), which was cited in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack, 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942), and
then cited in Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 21. As reliance on Central Vermont illustrates, this
association of the burden of persuasion with what is undeniably substantive law pre-dates
the Erie-doctrine and its concern that federal courts mirror state law. In fact, prior to Erie,
under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts sitting in
diversity consistently chose the burden of persuasion rule associated with the controlling
substantive law. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 754-5 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) (noting the pre-Erie decisions).
110 See Morgan, supra note 6, at 185-87.
105
106
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forums, but also to the optimal effectuation of the policy of the
substantive rules being applied.
To take an extreme but important example, it is commonly
believed that Continental civil-law jurisdictions, by often failing to
specify explicit standards of proof, grant substantial discretion to
the fact-finding magistrate to select a standard of proof in particular
cases. 111 To the extent that this is so, this practice has been criticized
on the grounds that it has the potential to allow the magistrate
effectively to work major changes in the substantive law. 112 To put
this in the context of a choice-of-law problem, suppose a state
ordinarily permitting that kind of discretion about proof standards
chooses, in a particular case, to apply the substantive law from a
state that would impose liability only in the case of a defendant’s
negligence and would place on the plaintiff the burden of proving
the defendant’s negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. If
the forum court deploys its usual local discretion to craft an ad hoc
rule favoring the plaintiff so long as the probability of negligence
exceeds the minuscule, then for practical purposes, the forum court
has converted negligence liability into strict liability. 113
Recognizing the interdependence of the elements of substantive
claims and defenses with the allocation and severity of the burden
of persuasion, and acknowledging that both sets of rules express
policy preferences between classes of litigants, argue strongly for
choosing the relevant foreign law rules regarding that burden
whenever a forum court chooses to apply foreign law. 114 It is a

111 See generally Michelle Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 659, 666-69, 672-73 (2003) (explaining that most civil law jurisdictions do not
specify a standard of proof for civil cases and observing that, in such jurisdictions, the
burden of persuasion “is considered a matter of substantive law, not [a] matter of
procedural law”). Cf. Moritz Brinkmann, The Synthesis of Common and Civil Law
Standards of Proof Formulae in the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil
Procedure, 9 UNIF. L. REV. 875 (2004) (emphasizing the context-variability of both
common-law and civil-law standards).
112 See, e.g., Taruffo, supra note 111, at 672 (observing that the civil law arrangement
“can be explained or criticized in several ways, saying for instance that too much discretion
is left to courts”).
113 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 27-29. As to why the forum court would do this, it
is easy enough to fill out the hypothetical by supposing that strict liability is the forum rule
in this context, and the forum court considers that to be the better rule. The forum court
then might wink at the governing principles of choice of law, which require use of the
foreign rule on liability, while effectively applying forum substantive law.
114 In the special case where the only difference between the law of the forum and the
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sensitivity to such interdependence that is likely manifested in the
Supreme Court’s consistent placement of the burden of persuasion
on the “substantive” side of substance/procedure lines in choice-oflaw analyses. The first Restatement also recognized this—albeit
incompletely—in its allowance that persuasion burden rules are
sometimes “bound together” with the parties’ rights and duties
under the jurisdiction’s law. 115 And the second Restatement
identified the explanation for this connection—albeit imprecisely—
with its reference to rules the primary purpose of which are “to
affect the decision of the issue.” 116
2. The Burden of Production
In stark contrast with the burden of persuasion, the burden of
production—which is typically tested before the question of the
burden of persuasion can be addressed by the fact-finder—concerns
the adequacy of the parties’ efforts to provide the fact-finder with
information on the basis of which to reach a verdict and the
relationship between judge and jury. 117 It is focused on the
regulation of the litigation process itself, to use a commonly
invoked phrase. This is not because it has no effect on the result on
the merits, nor even because it is not aimed at doing so; but rather,
it is because it is intended to accommodate the forum’s often
competing interests in accuracy, efficiency, and the specification of
juridical roles, rather than to adjust the relative prospects of the
parties in regard to the merits of the claim.
This formal production burden can be understood as merely one
component of a broader sense of the “burden of production.” The
broader sense also encompasses a great variety of discovery rules
(with attendant sanctions), most admissibility rules (such as the
hearsay rule and the rule requiring the original of tangible records),
adverse inference rules (such as inferences from withholding or
destroying evidence), and much more. 118 The primary aim of this

law of another state consists in a difference in the burden of persuasion, taking that burden
as reflecting preferences of substantive policy means that the non-forum rule should be
followed.
115 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 10-12, 61-66 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
118 See NANCE, supra note 16, at 184-250 (illustrating these points through the concept
of the “weight” of evidence).
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collection of rules is to place pressure on adversarial litigants to
produce such evidence to the fact-finder to achieve an acceptable
balance between the goal of maximizing accuracy and the pervasive
need to minimize litigation costs. Its contours are not only related
to the kind of case involved (for example, civil versus criminal) but
also peculiar to the kind of adjudicative system that is being
employed, such as an adversarial jury trial. 119 Here, the forum
state’s interest in operating its adjudicative system is compelling. If
any aspects of the burden of proof should be governed by forum
law, regulations of the burden of production (in this broad sense)
are the best candidates.
Nonetheless, confusion arises from the fact that the two burdens
are interconnected in two important ways. First, the general
standard mentioned above for the narrower sense of the burden of
production—whether evidence has been introduced sufficient to
allow a reasonable finding in favor of the non-moving party—is
incomplete on its face without a specification of the burden of
persuasion in the context of which it is assessed. In some contexts,
specifically those involving only circumstantial evidence of an
ultimate fact, what is sufficient in this sense will depend, for
example, on whether the standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence or clear and convincing evidence. What is sufficient to
support proof by a preponderance of the evidence may not be
sufficient to support proof by clear and convincing evidence. 120
This kind of dependence, however, no more renders burden of
production rules necessarily about substantive policy than it renders
the great bulk of admissibility rules necessarily about substantive
policy. After all, in order to apply most admissibility rules, one
must know the rules of substantive law that determine the relevance
of offered evidence. 121 But no one seriously suggests that this
undeniable dependence necessitates the use of all or most nonforum admissibility rules. 122
Second, the initial allocation of the burden of production
typically (though not inevitably) falls on the party bearing the

See id.
See John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a
Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
121 See PARK, ET AL., supra note 71, § 5.02.
122 Perhaps some might. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
119
120
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burden of persuasion. 123 Some have emphasized that this allocation
of the burden of production has outcome-determinative capacity in
cases where there is no (or very little) evidence on an element of the
cause of action or defense. 124 If a plaintiff has very little or no
evidence on an element of his claim, the burden of production
requires a directed verdict (or other summary determination) for the
defense. Because of this effect on outcome, it is inferred that the
non-forum burden allocation should be applied in a choice-of-law
context. The observation is correct, but the inference is not.
Suppose in such a case that the matter were submitted to the factfinder. Given the assumption that a summary determination would
have been appropriate, a reasonable fact-finder would still decide
against the party bearing the burden of persuasion, here the plaintiff.
Ultimately, that burden does the work of favoring the defendant.
What purposes, then, are served by the summary termination, that
is, a ruling that the burden of production has not been satisfied?
They are the same purposes already identified: the saving of
unnecessary litigation expenses, when the jury verdict is confidently
anticipated by the trial judge, and the control of potential jury
irrationality. These are neutral procedural considerations that
should be resolved pursuant to forum policy. 125
Moreover, in other evidential contexts the burden of production
can be outcome-determinative in the opposite direction, requiring a
directed verdict, or partial directed verdict, for the plaintiff. 126 An
example would be a situation where the defense has no access to
evidence on a particular element of the plaintiff’s claim. The point
is that any of the unquestionably procedural rules that a forum uses

See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 337.
See id., § 344 at 734-36 (especially n.47).
125 When the trial judge is acting to prevent jury irrationality, the neutral procedural
goals are accuracy and the public perception thereof. Although such a ruling in fact favors
one side, that is not the point of taking the case from the jury, unless the trial judge is acting
improperly. Avoiding the costs associated with the necessity of retrial may counsel in favor
of permitting the jury to render its verdict and then granting a judgment non obstante
veredicto, for if that is reversed on appeal the original jury verdict can be reinstated without
the need for retrial. See, e.g., JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 86, § 7.22. In any event, all of
this is about judicial economy, not favoring a decision for one of the parties. The same can
be said for those cases, unlike the one hypothesized above, in which a court summarily
terminates the case to encourage one of the parties to present additional available evidence.
See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
126 See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 86, § 7.7.
123
124
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has such capacity. 127 It also goes without saying that parties will
invoke such rules just when they anticipate being benefited by their
application. For example, the operation of the hearsay rule can,
given the right arrangement of evidence, require an outcome
favoring the plaintiff. But, given the right arrangement of evidence,
it can also require an outcome for the defense. That is just part and
parcel of having a procedure governed by rules. Neither the hearsay
rule nor the burden of production is designed to favor one side or
the other, even though the impact in a particular case can, and
probably will, favor one side. Instead, both are designed to improve
the quantity and quality of the evidence upon which the fact-finder
ultimately makes its decision, to avoid the waste of judicial
resources, and to avoid irrational jury verdicts and improper trial
court control of jury decisions. Once again, this is all well within
the range of the procedural goals discussed above. It is no more
about favoring one side of the dispute over the other than is the
potentially outcome-determinative result of applying a rule
imposing a sanction for a party’s refusal to comply with pretrial
discovery requirements. 128
Indeed, the default initial pairing of the allocation of the burdens
of persuasion and production also generates confusion in judicial
opinions and academic commentary with regard to the reasons,
conflicts issues aside, that support these initial allocations to one
side rather than the other. Some of the factors often noted relate
more to one burden than the other, but standard treatments do not
tease them apart in this way. 129 Thus, in explaining the allocation
127 See GARNETT, supra note 3, at 21-22 (“[P]otentially any procedural rule in a given
context may affect the rights and duties of the parties and so alter the result.”).
128 The very fact of the default assignment of the initial burden of production to the
party bearing the burden of persuasion might seem to be an effort to favor the opposite
party. However, the usual initial assignment reflects the fact that the fact-finder will
typically start the trial of a case that does not settle at near equipoise between the plaintiff
and defendant, in which case the burden of persuasion often would require (in the absence
of evidence) a verdict against the party bearing the burden of persuasion, thus making
evidence taking unnecessary unless the burdened party moves the odds in its favor. See
McNaughton, supra note 120, at 1390. This argument illustrates how the initial assignment
can be essentially an efficiency rule, not a rule designed to favor one party over the other,
even though it depends on a different rule that is designed to favor one party over the other.
See NANCE, supra note 16, at 95-101 (providing further discussion of the fact-finder’s
starting point at trial).
129 See, e.g., Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 8-14 (1959); Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47
VA. L. REV. 51, 58-61 (1961). Some of the justifications encountered in judicial opinions
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of the burden of persuasion—the risk of non-persuasion—it is
certainly important that some claims are disfavored, such as a claim
that an opponent has breached a serious social norm. 130 But the idea
that one party should be favored because an opponent is likely to
have superior access to relevant evidence is a rationale that speaks
specifically to the allocation of the burden of production. Though
perhaps less obvious, the same is true for the idea that, when certain
ultimate facts are a priori likely to be true, the burden should rest
on the party claiming those facts are false. 131 It is easy to see,
however, how these varying considerations would get jumbled
together when the two burdens are initially (and collectively)
assigned.
3. Presumptions
Drawing the foregoing distinctions allows one to see the
implications for choice of law regarding presumptions. The term
“presumption” is used for a great many purposes, and even in the
context of proof at trial, historically courts have said things about
how presumptions work that are not easy to reconcile. 132 What
are unhelpful, either because they are tautologies or because they are contentless, such as
the argument that the burden of proof on an element should be placed on the party to whose
case the element is essential (a tautology) or the argument that the burden of proof should
be placed on the party asserting the affirmative of a proposition (usually an empty
formalism). See Cleary, supra, at 10-11; James, supra, at 58-59.
130 See generally Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 647 (1994).
131 For example, if a fact is a priori likely, given the uncontested facts of the case (or
even after some evidence has been presented), then ordinarily the fact-finder will
understand that and give the appropriate verdict, without the need to place the burden of
persuasion on the party arguing that the fact is false. So in jury trials, ordinarily a
modification of the otherwise appropriate allocation of the burden is most likely to be
needed, on the basis of such probability, in order to prevent trial judges from taking cases
from juries, in the interest of both accuracy and protecting appropriate juridical roles. We
thus have a justification of a rule regulating the burden of production, not the burden of
persuasion. The same conclusion still follows if the concern is that the jury will not
appreciate this a priori likeliness, because the judge determines whether the burden of
production has been satisfied, whereas the jury determines whether the burden of
persuasion has been satisfied. See PARK, ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.02. Changing the
allocation of the burden of persuasion would have little impact on jury irrationality.
132 See generally Edmund M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. & St. B. J.
255 (1937). Of course, as with burdens of proof more generally, the present thesis concerns
presumptions relating to material facts at trial, not presumptions that relate to ancillary
matters, such as determining the validity of service of process, subject matter jurisdiction,
and the like, which are typically instruments of procedural policy. See GARNETT, supra
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evidence scholars call “true presumptions” are legal devices that
require an inference from certain “foundational” or “basic” facts to
a “presumed” fact, where the import of this requirement is a shift of
either the burden of production or the burden of persuasion (or both)
regarding the presumed fact to a party that did not otherwise bear
it. 133 Despite intense debate over the years about which burden is
appropriately shifted and under what circumstances, there is a
considerable degree of consensus today that: (a) a presumption that
shifts the burden of production is most justifiable (if it is justifiable
at all) when the point of the presumption is merely to recognize the
logical or probative force of the inference from the predicate facts
(those that give rise to the presumption) to the presumed fact or to
address asymmetries in the availability of the evidence to the
parties; and (b) a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion is
most justifiable (if it is justifiable at all) when the point of the
presumption is to recognize a policy that is sufficiently important as
to warrant preferring the party benefited thereby in the event of
unresolvable uncertainty. 134 These points accept the process goals
involved in the regulation of the burden of production and the
substantive goals involved in the regulation of the burden of
persuasion. To the extent that this distinction is followed in
practice, and it (or something very much like it) often is, 135 the
argument already presented suggests an obvious resolution to the
choice-of-law issue: use presumptions shifting the burden of
production specified by forum law; use presumptions shifting the
burden of persuasion specified by the chosen non-forum law. 136

note 3, at 204.
133 See, e.g., PARK ET AL., supra note 71, §§ 2.07, 2.08.
134 See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, §§ 342-344.
135 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 603-606; FLA. EVID. CODE §§ 90.302-90.304; HAW.
R. EVID. 301-304; R.I. R. EVID. 301-305. Most American states follow a version of Federal
Rule of Evidence 301 that specifies, as a default rule, that presumptions shift the burden
of production or (depending on the state) that they shift the burden of persuasion. Compare,
e.g., MICH. R. EVID. 301 (prescribing default rule that a presumption shifts the burden of
production), and N.C.R. EVID. 301 (same), with UTAH R. EVID. 301 (prescribing default
rule that a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion), and WIS. STAT. § 903.01 (same).
But these are only default rules, subject to alteration by statute. Importantly, therefore,
every state chooses (albeit sometimes by default) which kind of presumption to use in each
context.
136 This was Professor Morgan’s position. See Morgan, supra note 6, at 192. The same
distinction should be applied to so-called tactical presumptions, ones as to which the
presumed fact is not itself an ultimate fact but is to be used by the fact-finder to infer an
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Drawing these distinctions also allows one to avoid familiar
paradoxes often associated with the substance/procedure
distinction. Suppose, for example, that the non-forum law invokes
a presumption that would shift the burden of production, whereas
the forum law invokes a presumption in the same context that would
shift the burden of persuasion. Under the suggested approach, the
non-forum’s presumption would not be applied because it is
understood as a component of the non-forum state’s regulation of
procedure, which may not be appropriate in the forum state’s
procedural system. At the same time, the forum state’s presumption
is inapplicable because that presumption is taken to be part of the
substantive policy of the forum state, with the manifested purpose
of favoring the party benefited by the presumption, a policy that, by
hypothesis, is not present in the non-forum state’s law. The
apparent result is that neither presumption applies, whereas some
kind of presumption would have applied if all the events and the
litigation had occurred in either the forum state or the non-forum
state. 137
The solution to this seeming lacuna in the proposed rules is the
recognition that the question whether the forum should invoke a
presumption to shift the burden of production is not foreclosed by
the indicated characterizations.
In particular, because a
presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion typically also shifts
the burden of production in wholly domestic litigation, the
hypothetical presents the occasion for the forum court to consider
whether the forum state’s management of the production burden
should be “detached” from its management of the persuasion
burden. In other words, if the procedurally neutral purposes of
shifting the burden of production are as important in the instant
litigation as they would be in entirely domestic litigation of the same
kind in the forum state, as might well be the case, then the
production-burden shifting aspect of the forum presumption should

ultimate fact. See Cleary, supra note 129, at 25-27. So-called conclusive presumptions,
ones that cannot be rebutted, are regarded as, in effect, alterations of the substantive law
itself. See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 65.
137 Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 334, cmt. b (A.L.I. 1934)
(illustrating a similar paradoxical result in the context of the statute of frauds: “If the statute
of frauds of the place of contracting is procedural only and that of the forum goes to
substance only, an oral contract will be enforced though it does not conform to either
statute.”).
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be applied even if the persuasion-burden shifting aspect is not. 138
Thus, such a production-burden-shifting presumption would be
employed whether the litigation takes place in the one state or the
other. To be sure, there could be differences in how these
presumptions would be implemented, as befits their status as
components of their respective procedural systems. But the
paradoxical element—that no presumption is found to apply—can
be eliminated. 139
A similar analysis applies if the forum has no presumption on
the issue. If a non-forum presumption shifts only the burden of
production, the forum ought not automatically apply the non-forum
presumption. But neither ought it automatically reject the use of
such a presumption. Rather, the forum court will need to ask
whether this want of a similar presumption is a considered judgment
of procedural policy within the forum. If it is not—as well may be
the case, especially when there is no forum cause of action
comparable to that of the non-forum state—then the court should
consider the question whether a presumption like the one applicable
in the non-forum state is consonant with the forum’s procedural
policy. If so, it should implement such a presumption, assuming
that the forum court has the authority to do so. 140
Notice what this means when the forum, in accord with the
principles suggested here, chooses to apply a non-forum
138 Of course, if the only reason that the forum state would shift the burden of
production in litigation involving wholly local events would be to achieve efficiencies
associated with matching the allocation of the burden of production to the allocation of the
burden of persuasion (see supra note 128), then there would be no reason to invoke a
detached presumption shifting only the former in the hypothetical case considered in the
text. But then there is nothing really paradoxical about the result.
139 Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457, 461-63 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying
Alabama choice-of-law principles and rejecting the application of a forum state
presumption against suicide that would shift the burden of persuasion to the insurer;
holding, however, that the burden of persuasion on the issue of suicide was on the insurer
independent of any presumption in accord with both forum and non-forum law; placing
the burden of production on the issue on the insurer, either in accord with the non-forum
presumption or, more plausibly, as a consequence of the allocation of the persuasion
burden).
140 The court may not have authority. See, e.g., NEB. EVID. R. 301 (“In all cases not
otherwise provided for by statute or by such rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is more probable than its existence.”). Under this and similar state rules, courts have
no authority to create presumptions that shift only the burden of production. Whether this
would limit courts acting in the choice-of-law context is an open question.
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presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion. By the present
theory, only that rule’s regulation of the burden of persuasion
should be applied, not the accompanying regulation of the burden
of production that would occur in ordinary litigation in the nonforum state. Instead, the forum court should use (or adapt) any
applicable forum rule that would shift the burden of production, or
create a permissive inference, or otherwise regulate the burden of
producing evidence. In the absence of one, the court should
consider whether this case presents the occasion for the introduction
of such a production-burden-shifting presumption into forum law,
given the incorporation from non-forum law of the rule shifting the
burden of persuasion. Again, that is a question of whether such a
burden of production rule would complement the procedural system
of the forum and is not predetermined by the judgments of the nonforum lawmakers.
V. A Closer Look at the Second Restatement and the Case
Law
If the foregoing analysis is correct, one would expect burdens of
persuasion to be selected from the non-forum law together with the
chosen substantive law, while burdens of production would be
supplied by forum law. Similarly, choices regarding true, rebuttable
presumptions would depend on whether the effect of the
presumption, once triggered, would be to shift the burden of
persuasion or the burden of production. In this section, we take a
closer look at the second Restatement’s provisions regarding
burdens of proof, as well as the case law, to see how they square
with the foregoing conclusions.
A. The Second Restatement
The second Restatement (unlike the first) does provide separate
norms for the “burden of proof” (i.e., the burden of persuasion), the
“burden of going forward with the evidence,” and the “sufficiency
of the evidence.” 141
But the principles stated are rather
disappointing:
§ 133 Burden of Proof
The forum will apply its own local law in determining which party
has the burden of persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue

141

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 133-135 (A.L.I. 1971).
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unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the
applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than to
regulate the conduct of the trial. In that event, the rule of the state
of the otherwise applicable law will be applied.
§ 134 Burden of Going Forward with the Evidence; Presumptions
The forum will apply its own local law in determining which party
has the burden of going forward with the evidence on a particular
issue unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state
of the applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than
to regulate the conduct of the trial. In that event, the rule of the
state of the otherwise applicable law will be applied.
§ 135 Sufficiency of Evidence
The local law of the forum determines whether a party has
introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a finding in his favor on
an issue of fact, except as stated in §§ 133-134.

Obviously, the second Restatement did not produce the clear
delineation suggested above. The first two of these sections provide
the same criterion of choice for both the burden of persuasion and
the burden of production, with no systematic difference in
application seemingly contemplated. To be sure, § 134 and § 135
at least provide default principles that seem to match the goals
served by rules articulating the burden of production. 142 On the
other hand, § 133 seems entirely off the mark, at least when
addressing the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issues at trial.
At a minimum, one would expect a default principle applying the
burden of persuasion associated with the otherwise applicable
substantive law. The drafters’ choice may partially reflect the fact
that burdens of persuasion must often be used in connection with
the determination of preliminary or ancillary matters—such as the
validity of service of process, jurisdiction of the court, admissibility
of evidence, or even choice of law—matters that are themselves
governed by forum law. On such matters, a preference for forum
law regarding proof burdens is both appropriate and
uncontroversial. 143 But, as discussed below, the drafters’ choice for
a default rule also reflects a split in the case law regarding allocation

142 Despite the section names, the drafters clarified that presumptions shifting the
burden of persuasion are governed by § 133 rather than § 134. See id. § 134 cmt. a. Again,
this is rather odd in light of the fact that the choice-of-law standards articulated in the two
sections are identical.
143 See supra note 17.
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in the context of the burden of persuasion on the ultimate factual
issues.
While § 133 clearly addresses the burden of persuasion, a
careful reading reveals that it says nothing about the choice of the
standard of proof. It speaks only to the allocation issue. None of
the examples offered by the drafters to illustrate the application of
the section even mentions a conflict regarding the standard of proof.
One possibility is that the drafters assumed all civil cases are
governed by a single standard of proof in all jurisdictions, so no
choice on that matter would be necessary. That seems quite unlikely
in light of the numerous cases prior to the publication of the
Restatement clearly using elevated standards of proof on some
issues in some states. 144 Another possibility is that the drafters just
assumed that the standard of proof would be taken from the rule of
the “state of the otherwise applicable law.” But if they did, it is
strange that they did not mention it. It is tempting to think that § 135
itself addresses the standard of proof, especially given its crossreference to § 133. But again, the drafters’ illustrations for the
former all concern the severity of the burden of production, not the
severity of the burden of persuasion. So why the cross-reference?
Perhaps it was thought necessary because of the principle, well
understood when the second Restatement was published, that the
severity of the burden of production inherently depends on the
burden of persuasion. 145 But even with that understanding, § 133
does not itself speak to choice of the standard of proof. 146

144 See, e.g, Jones v. Jones, 266 S.W. 110, 120-21 (Tenn. 1924) (requiring “clear and
convincing” evidence to prove mistake or fraud warranting reformation of written
instrument); In re Will and Estate of Freitag, 101 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Wis. 1960) (discussing
qualifications of rule requiring proof by “clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence” of
the elements of undue influence in order to avoid a will admitted to probate). Such elevated
standards of proof in civil cases had also received serious attention by commentators. See,
e.g., J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 251-55
(1944).
145 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146 Failure to attend to this issue is not uncommon in the field, even by those who
rightly perceive the importance of choosing the burden of persuasion in accord with the
otherwise controlling lex causae. See, e.g., WILLIAM TETLEY & ROBERT C. WILKINS,
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS: COMMON, CIVIL, AND MARITIME 64 (1994) (not
attending to standards of proof).
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B. The Case Law
1. The Burden of Production
The default initial allocation of the burden of production in
accord with the allocation of the burden of persuasion is so common
and uncontroversial as to preclude significant conflicts. In theory,
a conflict might arise if the burden of persuasion were allocated in
accord with non-forum law, and the party thereby burdened were to
argue that the burden of production should nonetheless remain on
the opposing party in accord with forum law. But no cases have
been found addressing such an argument. Similarly, no reported
decisions have been identified that would suggest the application of
non-forum standards as to when the burden of production is shifted
simply as a result of the strength of evidence presented by the
initially burdened party. Here, too, no doubt forum law prevails.
The significant choice-of-law decisions regarding the allocation of
the production burden concern, instead, the applicability of formal
presumptions that would shift this burden. This issue is addressed
below. 147
There are, however, numerous choice-of-law decisions
addressing the severity of the production burden. In this regard, the
rule of § 135 is supported by a long and consistent line of
decisions—many of which were decided long after choice-of-law
doctrine had passed beyond a slavish resort to the traditional
substance/procedure distinction—that have chosen forum standards
to test the sufficiency of the evidence. 148 The results of these
decisions support the theory advanced here, although the language
used to explain the results often draws on the familiar criteria
See infra Section IV.B.3.
See, e.g., Tobin v. Pa. R. Co., 100 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Lobel v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1951) (applying New York choice-of-law
principles); Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952) (applying
Pennsylvania choice-of-law principles); Hystro Products, Inc., v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d
1384, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wisconsin choice-of-law principles); Marquis v.
St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Myers v. Gaither, 232
A.2d 577 (D.C. App. 1967); Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 220 P.3d 1080, 1087-88 (Idaho
2009); Rastede v. Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 212 N.W. 751, 754 (Iowa 1927); Winslow
v. Tibbetts, 162 A. 785 (Me. 1932); Joffre v. Can. Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631
(Md. 1960); Weir v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 162 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Mass.
1959); Pa. Co. v. McCann, 42 N.E. 768 (Ohio 1896); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.,
68 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1949); Healthtronics, Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 382 S.W.3d 567 (Tex.
App. 2012).
147
148
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criticized here. In one rather typical case, the court rejected a
requested instruction instantiating the non-forum doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur because that doctrine is a “rule of evidence”—i.e., a
rule of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence—not a rule of
“substantive law,” nor one “intended to affect the parties’
substantive rights.” 149 The result is sound even if the reasoning is a
bit cloudy.
Another point is worth noting. While federal courts have
generally deferred to state law regarding burdens of proof under the
vertical choice-of-law principles of Erie, 150 there has always been
one identifiable point of resistance: standards for sufficiency of the
evidence. There are many reported cases where a federal court has
expressed the view that federal courts should apply federal
standards on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to be
submitted to a jury, despite the resulting potential for disparate
results between state and federal courts and the associated
incentives for forum shopping. 151 Decisions favoring a federal
standard in such cases have explained it in terms reflecting
sensitivity to the basis for the horizontal choice-of-law criterion
suggested in this Article, emphasizing the need “to preserve ‘the
essential character’ of the federal judicial system.” 152 In one
decision, 153 Judge Easterbrook reviewed some of the many
differences between federal jury practice and state jury practice, and
then commented:
These many distinctions, which must on occasion affect the
outcome of litigation, imply that each system of courts should be
thoroughgoing in using its own rule to determine which questions
go to juries and which to judges—and what is the proper relation
between trial and appellate judges. Absorbing bits and pieces of
some other procedural system cannot eliminate effects on the

149 Walter v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., No. A-95-184, 1996 WL 442673, at *4-5 (Neb.
Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1996) (noting that res ipsa was not available under forum law, given the
plaintiff’s particular allegations); see also Mohammad v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
947 A.2d 598, 602-13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (applying forum law to determine the
necessity of expert testimony in determining the existence of a defect).
150 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992); Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Rwy. Co., Sherwin-Williams Co., 963 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1992);
Gudgel v. S. Shippers, Inc., 387 F.2d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1967).
152 Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1969).
153 Mayer v. Gary Partners and Co., Ltd., 29 F.3d 330, 332-35 (7th Cir. 1994).
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outcome, but it can cause confusion and uncertainty in a federal
system with more than 50 distinct jurisdictions. 154

To be sure, a number of courts have held that state sufficiency
standards apply, 155 and the Supreme Court has yet to resolve this
split in authority. 156 Which position is better as a matter of federal
law is not the present subject, but the fact that rules relating to the
sufficiency of the evidence are closely tied to the accommodation
of procedural goals within a particular legal system does suggest
why many federal courts would be reluctant to incorporate state law
on the subject, notwithstanding the policy of Erie.
2. The Burden of Persuasion
Turning to the subject of the burden of persuasion, it is
illuminating to begin with the issue that the second Restatement
does not address, the matter of choice between different standards
of proof. Modern decisions have clearly recognized the connection
between the standard of proof and the “substance” of the claim. The
most elaborate explanations have come from the courts of
Delaware.
In the case of In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders’ Litigation, 157 the
plaintiff sought specific enforcement of a merger agreement, but the
defendant claimed breach of warranty and fraud in the
inducement. 158 The court held that New York contract law
controlled, which presented interesting conflicts regarding
standards of proof. First, Delaware law required proof of the
elements for specific performance by clear and convincing
evidence, while New York law permitted specific performance if
proof by a preponderance of the evidence was provided. The court
was not faced with an allocation issue, because both Delaware and
New York placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to
establish the elements of specific performance in question.
Moreover, both Delaware and New York law placed the burden of

Id. at 333-34.
See, e.g., Avlon v. Greencha Holding Corp., 239 F.2d 616, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1956);
Hamilton v. S. Ry. Co., 162 F.2d 884, 896-88 (4th Cir. 1947); K&T Enter., Inc. v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 174-78 (6th Cir. 1996).
156 See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1959); see also Mercer
v. Theroit, 377 U.S. 152, 156 (1964).
157 In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
158 See id. at 51-52 (summarizing parties’ contentions).
154
155
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persuasion for both breach of warranty and fraud in the inducement
on the defendant, but the standard of proof was (in one respect)
conflicting here as well. Delaware’s proof standard for the
affirmative defense of fraud was a preponderance of the evidence,
while New York’s was clear and convincing evidence. 159 Thus, the
plaintiff would benefit in two ways related to the standard of proof
by application of New York law: on the prima facie case for specific
performance, New York used the less demanding standard; and on
the affirmative defense of fraud, New York used the more
demanding standard.
Purporting to apply the principles of the second Restatement,
the court noted that its “conflict of law principles by no means
provide clear guidance,” but “the better reading of them suggests
that New York law should apply.” 160 In particular, with regard to
the prima facie case for specific performance, the court explained:
The question of which party has the burden of proof may be seen
as purely procedural. But the question of what the burden of proof
is typically constitutes a policy judgment designed to affect the
outcome of the court’s decision on the merits. For example,
Delaware’s choice of the clear and convincing evidence standard
appears to have been made for substantive policy reasons that do
not affect the trial process. The parties have not provided me with
authority suggesting why New York selected the preponderance
standard, which is not the prevalent rule in the United States for
specific performance. Because the New York approach is the
minority approach, I infer that New York public policy as
expressed by its common law of long-standing is in favor of a
standard that makes it easier, rather than more difficult, to hold a
party to its specific promise. 161

Similarly, in regard to the affirmative defense of fraudulent
inducement, the court chose New York’s clear and convincing
evidence standard as a manifestation of state policy preferences. 162
Much of the statement quoted above merely parrots the
language of the Restatement. The court does not elaborate on why

See id. at 52-54.
Id. at 53.
161 Id. The first sentence in the quoted passage, while obviously dictum,
acknowledges a body of conflicting case law discussed hereafter. See infra notes 166-83
and accompanying text.
162 In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 54.
159
160
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Delaware’s choice of the clear and convincing evidence standard
“appears” to have been made for substantive policy reasons, nor
why these reasons “do not affect the trial process.” Selection of that
standard of proof would certainly affect (and would be intended to
affect) jury instructions. But this simply confirms the court’s
previous observation that the Restatement’s criterion is not
particularly helpful. Instead, the meat of the court’s argument is its
statement that the selection of the standard of proof “typically”
constitutes a policy judgment, when this is combined with the last
quoted comment that New York’s policy “makes it easier, rather
than more difficult, to hold a party to its specific promise.”
Moreover, there is nothing special about standards of proof that
are higher (or lower) than the usual preponderance of the evidence
standard for civil cases. Even the usual civil standard of proof
represents a legal policy about the degree of preference between the
litigants’ claims when a decision must be made under uncertainty.
It just happens to be a policy that expresses a nearly even concern
about potential errors favoring each party. 163 While the Vice
Chancellor seemed to suggest that it was the unusualness of the nonforum preponderance standard for specific performance—its status
as a minority view—that manifested a class preference, such a
preference is also present in standards that are the majority rule. The
majority status merely indicates that there is agreement about the
kind of preference the law should express, not that there is no
preference at work. This is illustrated by the court’s selection of the
non-forum rule requiring clear and convincing evidence of the
affirmative defense of fraud, which is certainly a common, if not the
majority rule. 164
In this and similar cases, the allocation of the burden of
persuasion was not the issue; rather, the severity of the burden so
allocated was the issue. 165 The more puzzling aspect of the case law

163 It is not perfectly symmetrical, of course, because of the risk of non-persuasion,
i.e., someone must win when the fact-finder is in epistemic equipoise. Except in unusual
circumstances, the allocation of this risk skews the decision away from a result that would
maximize expected accuracy. See supra note 75.
164 See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 340 (describing the
common use of the heightened standard of proof for claims of fraud).
165 See also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 09C-07-87 MJB, 2011 WL
3926195, at *6 (Del. Sup. Aug. 31, 2011) (rejecting the claim of a conflict, but asserting
that if there were a conflict, then the standard of proof required to show the existence and
terms of a lost insurance policy would be governed by the otherwise controlling non-forum
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is the judicial response to situations where only the allocation of the
burden was in question, the forum standard of proof being the same
as the non-forum standard. These cases have presented a striking
split in authority, at least when the standard of proof being allocated
is the conventional preponderance of the evidence standard. 166
Many, though not all, involve the question of the burden of
persuasion on the issue of contributory negligence in tort cases. 167
law); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-118, 1993 WL 563244, at *3
(Del Sup. Dec. 21, 1993) (choosing the non-forum state’s standard of proof on the issue of
existence and contents of a lost insurance policy). Ostensibly applying the second
Restatement, Texas courts have taken the same approach to standards of proof. See
Arkoma Basin Exploration Company, Inc. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d
380, 383 (Tex. 2008) (choosing both Virginia’s law of fraud and Virginia’s standard of
proof related thereto, “clear and convincing evidence”).
Contrary statements can be found regarding the choice of the standard of proof, but they
are decidedly less authoritative. See, e.g., Boone v. Royal Indemnity Co., 460 F.2d 26, 2930 n.4 (10th Cir. 1972) (stating, in diversity case brought in Colorado federal court on a
fire insurance policy as to which Georgia contract law governed, that “[a]bsent a Georgia
judicial pronouncement or statutory law tying a certain standard of proof as a matter of
policy to the affirmative defense of arson, we hold that the Colorado law [requiring
preponderance of the evidence] applies . . . In reality there is no practical difference
between the Colorado and Georgia law since the latter requires only a preponderance of
the evidence instruction and the burden in both states as to arson is on the insurer . . . “);
Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1503 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (stating in dicta that forum New York’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard
would apply to fraud claim rather than California’s “preponderance of the evidence”
standard, but avoiding a decision about which state’s substantive law of fraud applied
because no conflict—aside from the differing burdens—was discerned in the requirements
thereof, and holding that, in any event, plaintiff had not met either proof standard); Finch
v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 887 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (stating that the
forum’s standard of proof applies as procedural, but citing authorities none of which
directly address the standard of proof, and adding that the plaintiffs’ would fail in their
claim whether the forum or the non-forum standard of proof were applied, making the
choice of a standard unnecessary dictum).
166 If a higher standard were involved, the implausibility of selecting forum law would
be too obvious to ignore. We have seen that a choice between a forum preponderance
standard imposed on a party and a non-forum heightened standard imposed on the same
party will be understood to implicate substantive policy preferences of the non-forum state.
How then could a choice between selecting forum law placing a heightened burden on a
party and non-forum law placing the same heightened burden on the opposing party not
be so understood? The latter difference is considerably more dramatic than the former in
its allocation of the risk of error.
167 Cases endorsing the selection of the forum allocation include: Helton v. Alabama
Midland Ry. Co., 12 So. 276, 285-86 (Ala. 1893): Shaps v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 826 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla. 2002); Babcock v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 404 N.E.2d
265, 273 (Ill. App. 1979); Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg, 73 N.E. 990,
996 (Ind. 1905); Levy v. Steiger, 124 N.E. 477, 477 (Mass. 1919); Jenkins v. Minneapolis
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What explains this?
Unfortunately, the published opinions are not very enlightening.
They typically use the same distinctions appearing in the
Restatements, but these distinctions are of little help, except as
convenient explanations of a decision reached on other grounds.
The puzzle is to understand why a court would be tempted to ignore
the fact that the allocation of the burden of persuasion is a regulation
of the trial process that expresses the law’s preference for one side
of the dispute over the other. Because that allocation determines
how the fact-finder is instructed to decide the case when the factfinder is in equipoise—unable to decide whether the standard
specified as part of the burden of persuasion has or has not been
satisfied—it expresses an important legal preference for the nonburdened party. 168 The risk thus allocated is no trivial matter to the
parties. The cases that do not settle tend to be close cases, and
& St. L. R. Co., 145 N.W. 40, 42 (Minn. 1914) (alternative basis for holding); Wright v.
Palmison, 260 N.Y.S. 812 (App. Div. 1932); and Arnold v. Ray Charles Enter., Inc., 141
S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1965).
Cases endorsing the selection of the non-forum allocation rule include: Southern Ry. Co.
v. Robertson, 66 S.E. 535, 536-37 (Ga. App. 1909); Redick v. M.B. Thomas Auto Sales,
273 S.W.2d 228, 232-35 (Mo. 1954); Olson v. Omaha & C.B. St. R. Co., 267 N.W. 246,
248 (Neb. 1936); Precourt v. Driscoll, 157 A. 525, 529 (N.H. 1931); Fitzpatrick v. Int’l
Ry., 169 N.E. 112, 115 (N.Y. 1929); Sloniger v. Enterline, 162 A.2d 397, 398 (Pa. 1960);
Gordon’s Transports, Inc. v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 313, 321-24 (Tenn. App. 1956); DeSantis
v. Wackenhut, 732 S.W. 2d 29, 33 (Tex. App. 1987): Peterson v. Warren, 143 N.W.2d
560, 567 (Wis. 1966) (dictum). When federal courts are not bound by Erie to mirror state
court choice of law—in particular, when dealing with federal choice-of-law not arising out
of diversity jurisdiction—they have chosen the allocation of the burden of persuasion in
accordance with otherwise controlling substantive law. See, e.g., Van Muching [sic] & Co.
v. M/V Star Mindanao, No. 82-1092, 1986 WL 6303, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1986) (taking
the burden of persuasion (as well as the right to an award of attorney’s fees) as substantive
and thus subject to the parties’ contractual choice of law; applying the contractually chosen
English admiralty law on the burden of persuasion).
168 To be sure, an allocation of the risk of non-persuasion to the plaintiff can be
explained, at least in part, based on purely efficiency considerations, as a result that avoids
the costs of enforcement. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics
of Legal Burdens, 12 BYU L. REV. 1, 1-34 (1997) (noting “remedy construction costs,
enforcement costs, and transaction costs associated with payment as justifications for the
default rule favoring the defendant). This might seem to support the choice of the forum
allocation because litigation efficiency is within the scope of neutral procedural goals.
However, in a choice-of-law context, by assumption the contrary allocation has been made
by another jurisdiction, whose allocation cannot be so explained, which means that the
choice between the two rules cannot be explained entirely on efficiency grounds either.
See NANCE, supra note 16, at 32-36 (discussing the various rationales supporting the
allocation and severity of the burden in civil cases, including the efficiency argument).
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almost any case that goes to trial can end up a close one on the facts,
so advocates fight hard to have the advantage of not bearing that
risk. 169 As a consequence, the potential for forum shopping can be
quite real. 170
One obvious answer to this puzzle is that some courts have not
given careful attention to the issue, relying instead on a traditional
substance/procedure distinction to reach a convenient forumfavoring result. 171 To be sure, the opposite dynamic is encountered:
some of the decisions choosing non-forum allocations encountered
a distinct foreign cause of action for which there was no
corresponding domestic rule, and in such cases, following the nonforum allocation avoids the inconvenience of a fresh application of
forum principles to allocate the burden. 172 In any event, an
examination of the opinions in these cases reveals that those
applying the non-forum allocation rule are usually more extensively

169 Disputes on the issue can make it to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986) (displacing, on constitutional
grounds, the common-law rule for defamation that placed the burden of persuasion on the
issue of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement on the defendant (i.e., to prove
truth); placing that burden on the plaintiff (i.e., to prove falsity) when the defendant is in
the “media” and the subject matter of the defamatory statement is one of “public concern”).
See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD 18-23 (2013)
(discussing the importance of understanding “equipoise” as covering a range of practically
indistinguishable values of epistemic warrant, not just those in which there is a perfect
balance of competing evidence, and arguing that the existence of this range is of practical
importance in the litigation of disputes).
170 This is true notwithstanding the fact, emphasized by the drafters of the
Restatement, that in many cases neither allocation of the burden of persuasion will defeat
the expectations of the parties at the time of the occurrence of the events giving rise to
potential liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133 cmt. b (A.L.I.
1971).
171 Arguing that the better view is to choose the non-forum allocation, one court
observed that, when a court chose the forum allocation, it was simply “choosing the
appropriate classification to enable it to apply its own familiar rule.” Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754, 766 n.2, 756 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
172 The same point holds when the forum and non-forum rules of conduct are similar,
but not the same, as when they use different standards for what constitutes contributory
negligence. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-20 (1943) (approving the trial
court’s selection, pursuant to New York conflicts law, of the burden of persuasion rule of
the non-forum state’s statutory cause of action; refusing, on waiver grounds, to consider a
challenge to the trial court’s choice of non-forum law regarding placement of the burden
of persuasion on common-law cause of action for negligence).

286

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

explained than those applying the forum rule. 173 Of course, a court’s
divergence from a perceived traditional rule may have triggered a
sense of obligation to provide a fuller explanation, but that
nonetheless speaks to the thoughtfulness devoted to the choice. 174
Part of the explanation for selecting the forum allocation on the
burden of persuasion might lie in the fact that its allocation typically
coincides with the initial allocation of the burden of production. 175
If one thinks that the production burden involves the more important
of the functions associated with the allocation, then one might be
inclined to think the answer to the choice-of-law question should be
driven by the production burden, resulting in a preference for the
forum rule. However, tying the initial allocation of the burden of
production to that of the burden of persuasion is not a logical or
practical necessity. It is merely a default principle adopted because
one of the parties must begin the offering of proof and because this
default principle has advantages for the efficient administration of
trials. 176 If the forum court does not think that the coinciding
allocation of the two burdens makes sense, the forum court can alter
that result, even though it incorporates the burden of persuasion of
the non-forum court. There is no good reason that the allocation of
the persuasion burden must be determined by the allocation of the
production burden.
Suppose the jurisdiction of a Continental court is invoked, one
that does not permit the parties to control the presentation of the
evidence, and therefore does not even recognize a burden of
production (at least not in any sense like that in adversarial
proceedings). 177 And suppose this forum court selects the tort or

173 Some of the problems with the opinions endorsing the choice of the forum rule
have been mentioned earlier. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. Some of these
opinions do not give serious attention to the issue, but rather pass by it with the attribution
of a quick label as either substantive or procedural. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ray Charles Enter.,
Inc., 141 S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1965) (applying the forum North Carolina rule regarding
placement of the burden of proving facts regarding an absolving condition in a contract,
but providing only a one-paragraph treatment that fails even to identify any conflict that
needs to be resolved between forum law, on the one hand, and either the law of the place
of contracting, New York, or the law of the place of performance, Virginia).
174 See, e.g., Redick v. M.B. Thomas Auto Sales, 273 S.W.2d 228, 232-34 (Mo. 1954)
(overruling earlier Missouri law and choosing the non-forum allocation).
175 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 128.
177 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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contract law of an Anglo-American jurisdiction as controlling. The
forum court should, and probably would, incorporate the non-forum
state’s burden of persuasion, both in terms of its allocation and its
severity, but, the court would simply ignore the allocation and
severity of the burden of production that the Anglo-American
jurisdiction would recognize for such a case. 178 Conversely, an
American forum should follow a civil-law rule on the burden of
persuasion for a cause of action governed by the corresponding
European substantive law, provided such a proof rule can be
identified. 179 Arguably, this makes sense even when the civil-law
rule allows the fact-finder considerable discretion in setting the
effective standard of proof. 180 Again, this need not correspond with
the court’s allocation of the burden of production.
Interestingly, among courts that have chosen forum law on the
allocation of the burden of persuasion, no case has been identified
in which the court also faced a substantial difference in the standard
of proof. If they had, the choice of forum law would have been
much less plausible. As we have seen, courts rightly perceive a
difference in the standard of proof as an expression of the law’s
preference between classes of litigants. 181 What if this were coupled
with an allocation difference? Suppose that forum law places the
burden of proving X (say, someone’s negligent conduct) on the
plaintiff under the usual preponderance of the evidence standard,
while the non-forum law in question places the burden of proving
not-X (i.e., the exercise of due care) on the defendant according to
the clear and convincing evidence standard. If one were serious
about choosing forum law on the allocation issue but non-forum law
on the standard issue, how would a court respond? The most
plausible way would be to say that it is the plaintiff’s burden to show
that there is not clear and convincing evidence of the person’s due
care. 182 Faced with such a jarring prospect, a court would almost
178 See, e.g., Maximilian Seibl, Burden of Proof, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 236, 237-39 (2017) (reviewing the conflict-of-laws literature with a
focus on European law).
179 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
180 Cf., Johnson v. Knight, 459 F. Supp. 962, 967-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (applying
Mississippi conflicts principles to select Alabama negligence and breach of warranty
claims together with Alabama’s proof standard requiring “belief in the fact to the
reasonable satisfaction” of the fact-finder).
181 See supra note 157-65 and accompanying text.
182 The other conceivable construction, that the plaintiff bears the burden to show the
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certainly match the choice of the allocation of the burden to that
regarding the standard, that is, to have both governed by non-forum
law. 183
In the absence of a better justification for the decisions that have
chosen the forum state’s allocation, the conclusion to be drawn from
these considerations is that the burden of persuasion, in both its
allocation and its severity (the standard of proof), should be
governed by the pertinent non-forum state rule. 184
3. Presumptions
According to the theory presented here, when the non-forum
state presumption would shift the burden of persuasion, it should be
applied, while such a forum state presumption shifting the burden
of persuasion should not. In fact, the cases generally so hold. 185 On
person’s negligence by clear and convincing evidence, would place a significantly higher
burden on the plaintiff than would be true for events occurring entirely in either state. No
plausible justification for such a result comes to mind.
183 This has been the result in the vertical choice-of-law context. See, e.g., Garrett v.
Moore-McCormick, 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942) (holding that a state court adjudicating a
federal admiralty claim must use the federal rules on both allocation and severity of the
burden of persuasion regarding the validity of a release signed by the plaintiff).
184 Modern conflicts theory generally accepts the occasional dépeҫage—using only
some portions of non-forum substantive law and not others (or even rules from different
non-forum states on different issues) if good reason exists for doing so. Yet courts and
commentators, whether working in the context of traditional approaches, like that of the
first Restatement, or in the context of more modern approaches, like that of the second
Restatement, often find it difficult to see how one can justify severing the connection
between a substantive element and the burden of persuasion associated with it in the
selected law. See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, §§ 69, 70.
185 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1956) (applying
Alabama choice-of-law principles; rejecting the application of a forum presumption
against suicide that would shift the burden of persuasion, but holding that the burden of
persuasion on the issue of suicide was on the insurer independent of any presumption in
accordance with both forum and non-forum law); Kabo v. Summa Corp., 523 F. Supp.
1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania choice-of-law principles and tying the
allocation of the persuasion burden to the choice between Nevada’s and Pennsylvania’s
Innkeeper Statutes); Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry v. Grom, 133 S.W. 977, 980-81 (Ky.
1911) (applying non-forum state’s presumption of negligence that placed on defendant
railroad the burden to prove that plaintiff’s injury was not the result of defendant’s
negligence); Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah 1947) (applying non-forum
state’s rule regarding the effect of a presumption of negligence, emphasizing that the
presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant); see also Otal Inv. Ltd. v.
M/V Clary, 494 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying federal choice-of-law principles and
holding that a maritime presumption of the forum shifting the burden of persuasion is
substantive and thus abolished by the applicable international convention regarding
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the other hand, when the forum presumption would shift only the
burden of production, it should be applied, whereas a non-forum
presumption of this kind should not. Again, this is the usual result
in the cases. 186
To be sure, considerable confusion attends the use of
presumptions. Often the term “presumption” is used in a manner
that does not refer to a rule that shifts the burden of production or
the burden of persuasion from one party to an opponent upon the
former’s proof of specified foundational facts. 187 In the present
context, the most important confusion arises because a court may
use the term simply to explain the initial allocation of the burden of
persuasion. Examples can be seen where a court says there is a

collisions at sea). But see Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 12 So. 276, 285 (Ala. 1893)
(declining to apply non-forum presumption shifting the burden of persuasion; St. Louis &
S.F. R. Co. v. Coy, 168 S.W. 1106, 1110-12 (Ark. 1914) (seemingly applying forum
presumption shifting burden of persuasion). Of course, such early cases tend to be affected
by simplistic criteria of what is procedural for choice-of-law purposes.
186 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 848-50 (1st Cir. 1956)
(applying Massachusetts choice-of-law principles; using forum state presumption of a
manufacturer’s knowledge of dangerous quality of product, noting that the presumption
shifts the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, and therefore governs the
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury); Md. Casualty Co. v.
Williams, 377 F.2d 389, 393 (5th Cir. 1967) (applying Mississippi choice-of-law
principles; rejecting application of non-forum presumptions that would shift only the
burden of production); Weber v. Continental Cas. Co., 379 F.2d 729, 732 (10th Cir. 1967)
(applying Oklahoma choice-of-law principles; rejecting application of a non-forum
presumption in part because it did not shift the burden of persuasion); Marquis v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369-70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (rejecting
application of non-forum presumption that would shift burden of producing evidence);
Boersma v. Amoco Oil Co., 658 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (Ill. App. 1995) (rejecting
application of non-forum Indiana res ipsa loquitur rule because it entailed a rebuttable
presumption that would shift only the burden of production); Richardson v. Pacific Power
& Light Co., 118 P.2d 985, 996-97 (Wash. 1941) (discussing appropriate application of
forum state presumption of due care that shifts only burden of producing evidence, noting
that jury instruction erroneously suggested that burden of persuasion was shifted as well);
see also Ishizaki Kisen Co., Ltd. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1975)
(applying second Restatement in admiralty case; holding that a presumption shifting the
burden of persuasion was substantive and inapplicable under controlling non-forum law,
and specifically stating, “Were the [presumption] designed merely to shift to the violator
of the statutory rule the burden of going forward with the evidence its characterization as
‘procedural’ would be proper.”).
187 For example, courts sometimes use the term to describe legal devices that, upon
closer inspection, involve mere permissive inferences. See, e.g., In re Estate of McGowan,
250 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Neb. 1977) (interpreting earlier rulings described in terms of
presumptions (of undue influence) as really only involving permissive inferences).
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“presumption against fraud,” as part of the explanation that the
defense bears the burden of proving plaintiff’s fraud in order to
avoid a contractual duty; or saying that there is a “presumption of
innocence,” as part of charging the jury that the burden of proving
arson that would vitiate the insurer’s duty under a fire insurance
policy rests upon the defense. 188 Suffice it to say that a lack of
sensitivity to such phenomena can lead to confused decisions on
choice of law. 189 From a choice-of-law perspective, it should make
no difference whether or not the jurisdiction supplying the
substantive rule of decision uses something called a presumption to
achieve its goals. What matters is the effect given to such
presumptions. 190
Consider a 2006 federal interpleader case arising under ERISA,
DaimlerChrysler Corporation Healthcare Benefits Plan v.
Durden. 191 The issue was which of two women claiming to have
been married to a deceased employee of DaimlerChrysler would
receive “surviving spouse” benefits. 192 The determinative factual
issue was whether the first marriage was ever dissolved before the
second marriage was undertaken, a matter on which the evidence
was unclear. 193 Long-established principles of interpleader were
unhelpful in placing the initial burden of persuasion on one of the
two claimants. 194 In any event, the court did not even discuss an
188 See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Hairston, 62 S.E. 1057, 1066 (Va. 1908) (using
the language of a “presumption of innocence” to assign the intermediate “clear and
satisfactory proof” burden of persuasion to the insurer to prove exclusions from coverage
involving alleged acts of moral turpitude by the insured).
189 See, e.g., Neve v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Phila., 357 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Mo. Ct. App.
1962) (rejecting a foreign allocation of the burden of persuasion that is explained in terms
of a presumption on the ground that presumptions in the forum only shift the burden of
production).
190 See, e.g., Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 271 S.W. 806, 812-13 (Mo. 1925)
(applying the non-forum state’s rule regarding the effect of a presumption of negligence
that determines the burden of persuasion; explaining the result as an initial allocation of
the burden of persuasion).
191 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
192 Id. at 920-21.
193 Id.
194 For example, according to one line of authority, “each claimant has the burden of
establishing the right to the fund or property by a preponderance of the evidence.” 7
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1714 at 629 (3d ed. 2001). That principle is unhelpful in the extreme,
at least in this context, because the point of the allocation aspect of the burden of
persuasion was to place the risk of non-persuasion on one of the claimants, and the
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initial allocation of the burden of persuasion apart from the matter
of competing presumptions. Instead, it used these presumptions to
directly allocate the burden of persuasion and to specify its severity.
Because federal law defers to state law regarding the question
of who is the surviving spouse, the court was required to address the
question of which state law to follow. 195 On the one hand,
Michigan’s presumption of the validity of the later marriage placed
the burden of persuasion on the first wife to show by “clear and
positive proof” that the first marriage had not been dissolved.196
Alternatively, Ohio’s presumption of the continuing validity of a
prior marriage placed the burden of persuasion on the second wife
to show by “concrete proof” that the first marriage had been
dissolved. 197 In this non-Erie context, the federal court followed the
second Restatement in resolving that question. 198 It recognized the
Restatement’s general rule that the validity of a marriage is
determined by the law of the state with “the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage,” and the court
determined that to be Ohio, because of the marital domiciles. 199 It
also examined whether this choice was overridden by the benefits
plan’s contractual choice of Michigan law. 200 It concluded it was
not, because the two state presumptions represented fundamental
but incompatible policy preferences about which spouse should win
in the context of unresolved doubt about the dissolution of the first
marriage. 201 In the interest of uniformity, the dissenting judge
would have allowed the contractual choice of law to prevail for all
employees, regardless of domicile. 202
Significantly, neither the majority nor the dissent—nor, for that
matter the second wife—argued that these state law presumptions

suggested standard would place that risk on both claimants, with the result that the fund or
property could not be awarded to either claimant if the court remained unconvinced by the
evidence, even when there was no doubt that one of the claimants is entitled to the property.
195 See 448 F.3d at 922.
196 Id. at 925-26.
197 Id. at 926.
198 See id. at 922-23.
199 Id. at 924-25 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283
(A.L.I. 1971)).
200 Id. at 923-27 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187).
201 Daimler, 448 F.3d at 925-27.
202 Id. at 928-29.
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were procedural only and thus inapplicable in federal court. And
neither opinion discusses the comment by the drafters of the second
Restatement, which (unsurprisingly) distinguished between two
categories of presumptions—those that should follow forum law
because they “are concerned primarily with judicial
administration,” and those that should follow the non-forum law
because their “primary purpose is to affect the decision of the
issue”—and then placed the kind of marital presumptions involved
in Durden in the former category:
[One] category comprises rules that are concerned primarily with
judicial administration. Such rules may be designed to facilitate
a finding in accordance with the balance of probability. Examples
are rules which provide that a ceremonial marriage shall be
presumed to be valid and that a marital status shall be presumed
to continue . . . . When rules of this sort are involved, the forum
will apply its own local law . . . .[T]here is no reason why the
forum should assume in such instances the burden that would be
involved in ascertaining and then in applying the relevant rules of
the state of the otherwise applicable law. 203

Striking here is the capacity of authorities to be in stark
disagreement about the rationale of particular presumptions when
considered apart from their practical impact on burdens at trial,
which manifestly did not control the Restatement drafters’
categorization. 204 And the obvious antidote for this uncertainty is
focusing on that practical impact. The court in Durden apparently
did so, as it did not infer from the language quoted above that the
presumptions at issue were “concerned primarily with judicial
administration.” Instead, the court implicitly adhered to a practical

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 cmt. b (A.L.I. 1971).
One might argue that the drafters’ comments are inapposite to the situation in
Durden, because the drafters here considered only presumptions that regulate the
production burden. But the logic of the Restatement is ostensibly driven by its purpose,
not its impact. Whether a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion or the burden of
production, the Restatement’s test looks to whether the primary purpose is to regulate the
conduct of the trial or to affect the decision of the issue. See id. cmt. a (stating that
presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion are governed by § 133, which articulates
the same criterion of choice). And the drafters placed the kind of marital presumptions
involved in Durden in the category of presumptions the primary purpose of which are to
regulate the conduct of the trial. If, despite appearances, the drafters’ categorization would
have been different had they considered marital presumptions that affected the burden of
persuasion, as in Durden, then to that extent the Restatement would endorse, sub silentio,
the approach suggested in this Article.
203
204
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test: a regulation of the burden of persuasion—a specification of its
allocation or its severity—should be taken together with the
elements of the chosen substantive law to which it relates.
VI. The Complications of Purposive Mismatch
A. Purposes and Functions
The discussion thus far does not fully account for the possibility
of a mismatch between the purpose of the non-forum proof rule and
the function that the rule serves. To be sure, sometimes a potential
mismatch can be avoided. In many situations, there may be little or
no history for the rule that clearly identifies its original purpose.
When a court faces such a choice-of-law problem, it is entirely
reasonable to assume that the current function of the rule was (or
now is) the intended one. The same conclusion is plausible when
the express purpose does not match the function, but the expression
of the purpose by the rule’s promulgator is very old, subject to a
purposive desuetude. That is, whatever the original purpose of the
rule, if its function is different, over time one would expect that this
mismatch would be discovered and corrected. If the function
remains unchanged, then it is fair to conclude that the purpose of
the rule has evolved to coincide with its function.
But this sort of avoidance strategy will not always be possible.
Sometimes, the recently stated (or reaffirmed) purpose of a nonforum rule will not match its function. In that case, what is the
forum court to do? In light of the foregoing discussion, two
conspicuous situations might arise in the burden of proof context.
First, a burden of proof rule in the non-forum state may be explicitly
articulated as designed to serve neutral procedural goals, but the rule
implemented may actually function to favor one class of litigants
over another. Suppose, for example, that the non-forum state has
promulgated a rule placing the burden of persuasion regarding the
defendant’s negligence on the defendant, perhaps by way of the
operation of a presumption. It has explained this allocation by
virtue of the plausibility of the inference endorsed by the
presumption and defendant’s superior access to evidence regarding
the defendant’s negligence, thus suggesting the goal of improving
accuracy by avoiding premature termination of the case and
providing an appropriate incentive to produce evidence. The
“legislative” history (whether the rule originates from a legislature
or a court) says nothing about (or even denies) favoring plaintiffs as
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a class by use of the rule. 205 Should the forum court honor this
statement of purpose by characterizing the rule as merely
procedural, or should it recognize the function of the announced rule
in favoring a particular class of plaintiffs?
Second, a proof rule in the non-forum state may be explicitly
articulated to purposely favor one class of litigants over another, but
the rule announced may actually serve only to make adjudication
more (or less) efficient, more (or less) accurate, or otherwise
promote (or undermine) procedural goals. Suppose that the nonforum state employs a presumption against suicide that shifts the
burden of production on the issue of suicide, but not the burden of
persuasion, to the defendant insurance company. And suppose that
the rule is ostensibly justified in terms of a policy to protect the
insured’s good name and the family of the insured individual from
economic distress. 206 Should the forum court honor this statement
of purpose by declaring the rule a part of, or to be taken together
with, the non-forum state’s substantive law, even if the function of
the presumption does not discernibly protect the insured’s good
name or the economic stability of the family of the insured? Or
should it instead recognize the function of the announced rule and
its reliance on the inherent unlikelihood of suicide as an explanation
of death in providing a logical basis for the fact-finder’s inference
against suicide?
Such mismatches can occur for many reasons, ranging from the
rule-maker’s laziness or ineptitude to calculated deceit. Rulemakers might pick what seems to be a useful doctrinal vehicle for
addressing a problem, without giving careful attention to
205 Cf. S. Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 66 S.E. 535, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) (discussing the
possible application of a forum statutory presumption shifting the burden of persuasion in
a context where non-forum substantive law was applied; characterizing the presumption
as procedural after explaining the presumption in terms that would warrant only a shift in
the burden of production). Interestingly enough, Georgia’s statutory scheme was
subsequently declared unconstitutional. See W. & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639
(1929), whereas a similar rule that would shift only the burden of production had survived
constitutional scrutiny. See Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219
U.S. 35 (1910); Nance, supra note 130, at 672-82.
206 Cf. Republic Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. 1976)
(relying on presumption of innocence of criminal conduct to justify presumption that shifts
burden of production to insurer to present evidence showing that insured engaged in
felonious acts resulting in the insured loss). Interestingly, this rule was later replaced by a
statute that put the burden of persuasion on the insurer to prove the felonious act of the
insured. See infra note 220.
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alternatives that are better tailored and introduce less confusion. A
rule-maker, especially a legislature, that makes a political decision
to favor a class of litigants by adopting a particular proof rule might
nonetheless want to hide its intentions by claiming that the effort is
merely to make trials more accurate or efficient. Alternatively, if a
legislature wants not to favor a certain class of litigants, but for
political purposes wants to make a public display as if it does, the
legislature might want to hide the actual intentions by adopting a
proof rule that modestly affects the accuracy or the cost of litigation.
What is the forum court to do with such situations?
Many of the most difficult problems of modern choice-of-law
methods, which are all based on some form of governmental interest
analysis, arise from the fact that they require the court to ascertain
the purpose or rationale of the rule the court is considering. 207 The
conventional, modern answer to the kind of questions posed above
is that the forum court should take those governmental interests into
account. 208 That may be correct as a general proposition, but the
difficulties in doing so are often considerable. Identifying a rule’s
“primary” purpose is not always easy, even when the lawmaker is
not trying to conceal it. There can be several equally important
purposes, and there is often a difference between the lawmaker’s
purpose in positing a rule and the interpreted purpose of the rule
itself. That is at least partially due to the fact that the purpose of a
rule for adjudicatory purposes is something “constructed” from
legal materials, not just observed or found. 209 Moreover, that
construction may take the interests of the state that promulgates the
rule into account, even if those interests are not contemplated by the
rule’s promulgators; indeed, the promulgators may not have had any
such contemplation at all. 210 To be clear, when the courts of a state

See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 56.
See, e.g., id. § 65.
209 This has been a familiar theme of legal theory for generations. See, e.g., HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (1994) (prepared for publication from 10th ed. 1958)
(summarizing norms for attributing a purpose to a statutory rule, and rejecting the search
for legislative “intent” as an historical fact). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE (1986) (developing sophisticated theory of interpreting legal materials that does
not depend solely on an historical inquiry into the intent of the promulgators of materials
being interpreted).
210 For discussion of the difficulties in determining governmental interests in the
choice-of-law context, see FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
207
208
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are engaged in the interpretation of that state’s rules, there may be
no acceptable alternative to such purposive inquiries and
constructions. But the situation can be different in the choice-oflaw context. The forum court may then choose not to focus on the
purposes declared by the non-forum rule-makers, nor to focus on
the purposes articulated by the non-forum courts in their
interpretation of those rules, but rather to concentrate attention on
the way the latter actually implement the rule in the non-forum
courts. 211
At least in the burden of proof context, this approach has several
benefits. The most obvious is relative simplicity for the forum
court. It need not struggle with the available legal materials from a
foreign jurisdiction for clues to an asserted, implicit, or undisclosed
purpose at variance with the actual function of the proof rule. It
need not engage the jurisprudential difficulties of constructing
legislative intent or purpose. 212 It need only determine whether the
non-forum state courts use the rule to fix the burden of persuasion—
to allocate it or to specify the degree of its severity. Other aspects
of the foreign burden of proof rules can be safely ignored. 213
Simplicity is coupled with improved accuracy in the

JUSTICE 131-39 (1993).
211 Cf. Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE
L.J. 311 (1923) (analyzing the various functions actually served by statutes of frauds and
arguing that choice-of-law rules should take such statutes as limiting substantive rights in
a way that is recognized together with other aspects of the selected lex loci, despite
diversity in the wording of state statutes and in how the state courts characterized the
purpose of such statutes for entirely domestic litigation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 141 (A.L.I. 1971) (specifying that the law otherwise governing
the validity and enforceability of the contract determines “[w]hether a contract must be in
writing, or evidenced by a writing, in order to be enforceable”).
212 Similar considerations influenced the Supreme Court’s decision to take a
seemingly bright-line approach to the interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act limitation
that bars promulgation of federal rules of practice and procedure that would alter “any
substantive right,” including a state-created right invoked in a diversity case. See Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 1431 (2010) (rejecting, as a
limitation on a federal class action, a state procedural rule suggested to have the real
purpose of modifying state substantive remedies). The plurality opinion rejected an inquiry
into the state legislative purpose as “an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse
confounded’.” Id. at 1440-41 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
213 One obvious exception would arise if a relatively new foreign rule had not yet been
applied by that state’s courts. In such a case, the forum would have no option but to try to
anticipate how it would be applied by the non-forum courts, and this might force the forum
to entertain the interpretive difficulties noted.
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identification of non-forum policy, at least if one accepts a modestly
cynical realism: the function of the non-forum rule is at least as
likely to reflect its actual purpose as are comments made by way of
justification of it. 214 And when purposive mismatch is merely the
result of ineptitude, using this approach provides additional
feedback—from jurisdictions other than the one announcing the
proof rule—as a result of which poorly crafted rules may be
improved. In fact, the approach puts some pressure, however small,
on rule-makers to promulgate rules that match their real purpose.
To do otherwise risks its rule being ignored by any other state that
would use the choice-of-law principle here suggested, namely:
attend to the actual function, not the declared (or inferred) purpose.
Indeed, the more that states follow the suggested principle, the
greater that pressure would be. It constitutes a small “truth in
advertising” measure. 215
This last point implicates a broader consideration. Among the
important choice-influencing considerations consistently noted is
the idea of protecting legitimate expectations. 216 While this idea
usually relates to the expectations of the potential litigants, 217 it is
also possible to think in terms of the expectations of the states
themselves. 218 This can be facilitated by allowing jurisdictions,
within limits, to make their own choice about whether their rules
should be considered part of their substantive law for choice-of-law

214 The Supreme Court has taken a similarly pragmatic approach in assessing the
constitutionality of presumptions against the accused in criminal cases. Rather than
encouraging lower courts to focus on the supposed purpose of the presumption, which may
be identified (or invented) by prosecutors only in the course of the appeal, the Court insists
that lower courts focus on exactly how the presumption actually operates at trial—on how,
in particular, the jury is instructed. See PARK ET AL., supra note 71, § 2.12.
215 Cf. Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011) (arguing that, in the vertical choice-of-law context, one
reason to reject incorporation of state procedural rules in conflict with the Federal Rules is
to discourage states from using procedural rules to dilute, sub rosa, substantive rights that
they themselves have created).
216 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (A.L.I. 1971).
217 See id. § 6(2)(d) cmt. g.
218 See id. § 6(2)(a) (referring to “the needs of interstate and international systems”).
See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 145-89 (1991). Professor Brilmayer assumed that states have little interest in
seeing their procedural norms respected by other states where litigation may arise and did
not contemplate specifically the potential coordination among states regarding burdens of
proof. See id. at 171.
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decisions made in other states. 219 In this context, this is achieved by
requiring the former to choose a rule the function of which matches
the purpose it purports to serve. In other words, if a forum-court
adopts the choice-of-law principles suggested above—dividing
proof rules according to whether they regulate the burden of
persuasion or the burden of production—then each other
jurisdiction has a choice when promulgating or interpreting its own
proof rules about how it wants that forum jurisdiction to perceive its
rule. If other jurisdictions want the forum court to enforce their rule,
they need only make it a rule that fixes the burden of persuasion, by
allocating it to one side or the other or by specifying the standard of
proof the fact-finder is to use. 220 If, instead, the jurisdiction’s
policy-makers cannot justify the employment of such tools to
themselves, then they should not be surprised when another state,
acting as the forum, does not apply the rule in question.
These advantages can be illustrated by reviewing a decision
with unusually extensive discussions of choice of law regarding
presumptions. In Melville v. American Home Assur. Co., 221 then
federal district judge Edward Becker had to select the controlling
law for a dispute over a life insurance policy purchased in Delaware
by a Delaware resident, but issued in New York by a New York
insurance company. The defendant denied coverage on the ground
of suicide. 222 The suit was filed in federal district court in
Pennsylvania, where the beneficiary resided, invoking federal
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. 223
Applying
Pennsylvania choice-of-law principles, which were then in flux,

219 The phrase “within limits” emphasizes that a state ought not be able to manipulate
other states into using its procedural rules by the mere expedient of declaring them to be
substantive. Even the non-forum state’s good faith characterization of its own rules as
substantive or procedural is not controlling for the forum state’s choice-of-law decision.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7, 584 (A.L.I. 1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(2). The non-forum state must do something that will
be recognized by the forum state as manifesting the non-forum state’s substantive policy.
220 Lawmakers can and do respond to perceived inadequacies in proof allocations.
See, e.g., Nobles v. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex., 53 S.W.3d 483, 486-89 (Tex. App. 2001)
(discussing statutory change placing burdens of proof on insurer regarding exclusion from
life insurance coverage for death occurring while the insured is engaged in felonious
activity).
221 443 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev’d, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
222 See 443 F. Supp. at 1068-76.
223 Id. at 1076.
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Judge Becker chose New York contract law as controlling. 224 He
then had to select which state’s rule regarding a “presumption
against suicide” to employ—New York’s “strong” presumption
that, upon proof of death otherwise within the policy, shifted the
burden of persuasion to the insurer to prove death by suicide, or
Pennsylvania’s rule that it is permissible to infer, based on common
understanding of human nature, that death was not self-inflicted. 225
Judge Becker, in a carefully reasoned opinion, chose the New York
presumption, applicable in the forum because it reflected New
York’s substantive policy. 226 Interestingly, he reached this
characterization despite the fact that New York courts had explained
the presumption in terms that would seem to warrant only a
permissive inference or, at most, a shift of the burden of
production. 227 For Judge Becker, apparently controlling was the
fact, clearly established in New York law, that this presumption
shifted the burden of persuasion to the insurer. 228
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Delaware’s
substantive contract law controlled under Pennsylvania’s choice-oflaw approach. 229 It then reasoned as follows: Pennsylvania courts
would consider “the presumption against suicide” to be an
instrument of substantive policy—apparently, regardless of what
kind of presumption is involved or how it operates in the legal
system of the state from which it is derived. Therefore, Delaware’s
permissive inference rule applies in the Pennsylvania forum. The
court gave no justification for its rather bizarre premise concerning
the presumption against suicide.
It relied on the second
Id. at 1097-1107.
Id. at 1076-82.
226 Id. at 1107.
227 See id. at 1082 (“New York’s presumption against suicide is based on ‘the truth
drawn from general human experience, that death by suicide is an improbability, that most
men cling to life’,” quoting Wellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 N.W.2d 540
(N.Y. 1944)); see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
228 See Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1082 (E.D. Pa.
1977):
The Pennsylvania presumption would only have aided plaintiff in meeting her
initial burden of producing evidence. This was accomplished in our trial without
the aid of a presumption, and once accomplished the presumption would have had
no further effect. In contrast, New York’s presumption would have had far more
effect, by treating the existence of a fair question of fact as mandating a legal
conclusion of accident (shifting the burden of persuasion).
229 See Melville v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 584 F.2d, 1306, 1311-15 (3d Cir. 1978).
224
225
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Restatement’s language that a non-forum presumption should be
applied if the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the non-forum
state is to affect the decision of the issue, 230 but it made no attempt
to inquire whether this was true as to the presumption of the nonforum state, Delaware, the law of which it chose to apply. The court
seemed to think that the task was to determine what the
Pennsylvania courts would decide to be the primary purpose of
presumptions against suicide in the abstract, i.e., disconnected from
any particular jurisdiction and from the effect of the presumption on
the burdens of proof in each jurisdiction, as if its character as
pursuing substantive or procedural goals did not depend on the
jurisdiction from which it was drawn. 231
The case would have been better and more simply decided had
the appellate court followed Judge Becker in focusing on which
burden was specified in each state, using that as the indicator of the
nature of the law’s primary purpose. The appellate court would
have found it considerably more difficult to indulge any assumption
that there is a primary purpose of presumptions against suicide that
is jurisdiction-independent. It would be virtually impossible to
ignore the fact that some jurisdictions, like New York, use the
presumption to allocate the risk of non-persuasion, while others,
like Pennsylvania, use the presumption in the management of the
burden of producing evidence. Moreover, using this approach,
Delaware’s permissive inference would not apply in Pennsylvania,
despite the selection of Delaware’s substantive contract law; rather,
Pennsylvania’s permissive inference would apply. 232 Regardless of
what the authors of those rules were thinking, that conforms with
the functions of permissive inference rules. 233

Id. at 1310.
The appellate court also seems to have relied on language in Judge Becker’s
opinion that suggests he had used the same line of reasoning, but a close examination of
his opinion reveals that he considered only New York’s presumption to be designed to
affect the decision of the issue, in the sense required by the second Restatement. See
Melville, 443 F. Supp. at 1077-82.
232 To be sure, both the trial court and the appellate court observed that there was no
available guidance from Delaware law on any presumption against suicide in that state, so
that both courts indulged the assumption that Delaware’s law was the same as
Pennsylvania’s. See Melville, 584 F.2d at 1308. From the perspective of the approach
suggested here, this means that the appellate court reached the correct answer for the wrong
reason, at least assuming its choice of Delaware contract law was correct.
233 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
230
231
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Once again, such an approach would leave Delaware free to
choose how it would want its presumption against suicide to be
understood in choice-of-law contexts. If Delaware wants its
presumption against suicide to be recognized by the courts of other
states adopting the present approach, it would only need to revise
its rule to shift the burden of persuasion to the insurer to prove
suicide, as was the rule in New York. It would thereby manifest its
intention to err on the side of the beneficiary claiming under the life
insurance policy, at least on this particular issue. Alternatively, if
Delaware’s policy is to regulate a jury’s permissive inferences, or
to place the burden of producing evidence on the insurer, then it
doing so should not generate significant concern that other
jurisdictions applying Delaware contract law would not necessarily
follow suit. Finally, if Delaware had a policy of favoring insured’s,
and was content to apply it only in litigation arising in Delaware, it
could leave its presumption in the form of a permissive inference, if
it really thought that permissive inferences would achieve the
desired goal.
B. Simple or Defeasible Rules?
It might seem that there is something odd about my proposal. I
started by emphasizing a particular proof rule’s primary purpose,
noting the difference between a rule whose primary purpose is to
express the law’s preference or hostility towards specific claims or
defenses, and a rule whose primary purpose is to fill out a given
legal system’s compromise among substantively neutral, procedural
goals. But my proposal, in some cases, would have courts ignore
the actual primary purpose in favor of a presumed primary purpose,
one presumed from the usual purposes associated with the functions
of particular proof rules. For the reasons articulated above,
however, this is a virtue not a vice, at least in the mine run of cases.
But what about the truly unusual case? Most rules probably are
not promulgated with choice-of-law considerations uppermost in
mind, and lawmakers might not respond to the signals provided by
other states’ choice-of-law rules. The question thus presented is
whether a forum court ought to have the discretion, similar to that
specified in the second Restatement’s burden of proof provisions,
to go behind the functioning of proof rules to examine legislative
history or other indications of lawmakers’ primary purpose. 234 In
234

Of course, the second Restatement does not take this approach consistently.
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particular cases, such an inquiry might reveal a serious policy
preference for one class of litigants over another, albeit manifested
(or even concealed) in a regulation that operates in the usual manner
of procedurally neutral rules. If the forum court is unwilling to
ignore this mismatch as suggested in the previous section, it might
feel impelled to incorporate such a rule together with the substantive
law it has chosen to apply, if only to deter forum shopping. The
question posed here is this: Is it wise to encourage courts to do this
sort of thing? Or would it be better to ignore it, or even to
discourage it?
Consider an intentionally extreme example. Suppose the
legislative history contains information indicating that the
legislature of the hypothetical State of Ama has decided that it wants
to discourage medical malpractice suits. This is because leading
members of the legislature believe, or so they claim, that
malpractice liability is the main cause of increasing costs for the
practice of medicine and that such costs are driving physicians out
of the state. The legal instrument seemingly chosen to discourage
suits is a statutory rule requiring any such action to be supported by
affidavits from five physicians licensed in the State of Ama to
practice the pertinent specialty and not deriving more than ten
percent of their income from testifying as an expert witness. 235 If
an action is brought in another state, one following the suggestions
presented here, how should that forum state handle such a statute? 236
Rather, it includes a complex mixture of simple rules and rules subject to a discretionary
escape clause. To take a couple of random examples, §§ 227 and 246 specify simple rules
for adverse possession, selecting the law of the state in which the property is located at the
moment adverse possession is claimed to have occurred, while § 146 specifies a defeasible
rule for personal injuries, selecting the law of the state where the injury occurred, unless
some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146, 227, 246 (A.L.I. 1971).
235 Cf. OHIO R. EVID. 601(E) (limiting the “competency” of expert witnesses in
medical malpractice cases based on how much of their time they spend in active clinical
practice); OHIO R. CIV. P. 10 (imposing affidavit requirement as condition on medical
malpractice suit). The National Conference of State Legislatures provides a compilation
of state statutes related to affidavits of merit and expert witness competency for medical
malpractice cases. See Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice Merit Affidavits
and Expert Witnesses, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 24, 2014)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liabilitymalpractice-merit-affidavits-and-expert-witnesses.aspx [https://perma.cc/99S6-NBGN].
236 Assume for simplicity that all the events associated with the alleged malpractice
occurred in the State of Ama and that the plaintiff resides there. Assume also, for the sake
of presenting a conflicts problem, that the statute in question does not limit its application
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The precise question presented by the choice principles
suggested here is whether the affidavit requirement regulates the
burden of production or the burden of persuasion. The answer to
that question may not be obvious from the statute, because it will
depend on how the affidavit requirement is actually implemented.
As explained below, there are a number of possibilities, and as
Professor Morgan wisely suggested in the context of
presumptions, 237 in the absence of a showing by the party inviting
application of the non-forum law about its functional effect, the
forum court should assume that the requirement serves only Ama’s
neutral procedural goals.
First, the requirement might be interpreted in Ama to require the
plaintiff to present the affidavits in order to avoid immediate
dismissal or summary judgment. Perhaps it is further interpreted to
require the plaintiff to present at trial the testimony of the affiants
(or other similarly qualified experts of the same number) in order to
avoid a directed verdict. But once so presented, the fact-finder
would employ the usual civil standard of proof, such as proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. In such cases, the requirement
would affect the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion,
because the fact-finder is not required to be persuaded by the
experts’ testimony beyond what was required before the
promulgation of the affidavit requirement. 238 Barring any escape
clause, the suggested approach would have the forum court ignore
Ama’s affidavit requirement, applying instead any such
requirement that appears in forum law. Alternatively, the
requirement might be interpreted in Ama to require the fact-finder
to find for the plaintiff only if the usual civil standard of proof is
satisfied and supporting testimony of five such experts is introduced

to actions litigated in the State of Ama.
237 See Morgan, supra note 6, at 193 (arguing that, because of the difficulties in
determining the effect of presumptions from the available resources, a non-forum
presumption should be given effect only when it is ascertainable that the presumption shifts
the burden of persuasion).
238 The distinction at work here is familiar in criminal adjudication. It arises, for
example, in connection with the rule that requires evidence corroborating a defendant’s
extrajudicial confession. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 145
(explaining that some jurisdictions treat the rule as a production requirement that
conditions sufficiency of the confession, something administered by the trial judge, while
other courts treat the rule as effectively altering the standard of proof applied by the jury
by requiring the jury to credit the corroborating evidence).
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and some number of them credited by the fact-finder. In that case,
the burden of persuasion has been altered, and barring any escape
clause, the suggested approach would have the forum court apply
the non-forum state’s rule. 239
The second situation is no more problematic than the application
of any substantive policy that the forum court might find otiose. 240
However, the first situation seems like it might be an appropriate
occasion for the operation of an escape clause, one that would
permit the forum court to look beyond the non-forum state’s
regulation of the burden of production to see if the regulation in
question is really designed to implement procedural goals, or if
instead it is designed to implement the law’s preference for one
class of litigants. In deciding whether to include such discretionary
authority for the forum court, the basic considerations are the
familiar ones: the tension between judicial flexibility to achieve
what is considered the best tailored results (here, optimal
effectuation of the non-forum state’s substantive policies) and the
competing values of predictability, uniformity, and efficiency of
decision-making.
In attempting to answer this recurring
jurisprudential puzzle regarding the use of rules, 241 several factors
peculiar to the burden of proof context are worth noting.
On the one hand, choice-of-law rules are not the sort of legal
norms on which private citizens generally rely in their primaryconduct decision-making. Most private parties do not contemplate
specific litigation, much less where a potential dispute will be
litigated or how that will affect the applicable law. This is especially
so in the context of rules the impact of which arises only at the point
of litigation, including burden of proof rules. 242 By minimizing the
239 A variant of this would arise if the fact-finder were instructed to use the usual civil
standard of proof but also were instructed that, in applying the usual civil standard, they
should infer that this standard has not been met if the plaintiff’s claim is not supported by
the testimony of five appropriately qualified experts. This would generate the same choiceof-law result as specified in the text.
240 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, §§ 67, 68 (discussing the “public policy”
objection to applying foreign law). One obvious consideration would be whether it is
against the public policy of the forum state to permit another state to require that expert
witnesses be chosen from those licensed in the non-forum state.
241 See generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:
MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001).
242 Cf. Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2006) (arguing for the importance of predictability in rules primarily
directed at private individuals who are inclined to follow the law’s directives in their non-
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losses associated with frustrated expectations, this consideration
opens space for the exercise of ad hoc judicial flexibility. This
supports the idea of an escape clause in any choice-of-law rule for
burdens of proof.
On the other hand, there are some contexts, primarily
contractual, where subtleties like burdens of proof are contemplated
by the parties ex ante. Insurance contracts provide widespread and
obvious examples. While modern conflicts norms generally admit
of contractual choice-of-law provisions, 243 this will not provide the
desired predictability in the present context. This is because the
ability of parties to make such contractual choices is itself delimited
by the substance/procedure distinction. The further the issue is
toward the procedural end of the spectrum, the less party autonomy
is respected. 244 Only a clear rule specifying which aspects of the
burden of proof are to be taken together with the controlling
substantive law would provide such predictability. 245
This
consideration, therefore, cuts against allowing an escape clause by
which the court could attempt to identify, after the fact, the primary
purpose of a foreign proof rule.
In addition, allowing such discretion, in contract disputes and in
disputes more generally, obviously invites the forum court to seek
primary purposes that are potentially at odds with the identifiable
function of the non-forum proof rule. In doing so, it presents the
possibility of error in such decisions in the sense that the court might

litigation conduct).
243 See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts
Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 576 (1999) (“As a
result of these developments, the fundamental rule in the United States as well as in Europe
today is that the parties to a contract can choose their own law.”).
244 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 4, § 128, at 436 (“The court may view the issue
as procedural and therefore governed by forum law rather than the law chosen [in the
contract].”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., RLS Assoc., LLC v. United Bank of Kuwait, 464
F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying New York choice-of-law principles
precluding contractual choice of procedural rules).
245 Case law leaves this somewhat clouded, though it seems to be compatible with the
theory articulated here. See, e.g., Van Muching, 1986 WL 6303 (taking the burden of
persuasion (as well as the right to an award of attorney’s fees) as substantive and thus
subject to the parties’ contractual choice of law; applying the contractually chosen English
admiralty law on the burden of persuasion); see also Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d
543, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting extension of contractual choice of law to “procedural
law” including “the question of burden of proof,” but so ruling in a context that involved
only the burden of producing evidence).
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mistakenly identify the primary purpose of the non-forum rule. It
is possible, for example, that the actual but unstated purpose of a
proof rule matches its function though the stated purpose does not.
Even in the extreme example described above, it is possible that
Ama’s legislators really did not want to make it more difficult for
malpractice plaintiffs to recover, that they merely wanted lobbyists
for the medical profession to believe they were “doing something.”
In such cases, using simple rules does a better job than reliance on
the stated purpose at bringing purpose and function into better
alignment, at least if one discounts a “purpose” like deceiving the
medical profession. The main point here is that, in deciding which
form of rule is better, one question is whether incurring the risk of
errors arising from the attempt to exercise an escape clause is better
or worse than the risk of errors that arise from a forum court’s
application of a simple rule that would not invite such discretionary
judgment. The present review of the reported cases suggests that,
once courts (or commentators) move away from the security of a
focus on which burden is being regulated, they are not particularly
good at interpreting the purposes of proof rules. 246
Moreover, to the extent that one considers such an alignment to
be an advantage, inviting such discretion potentially undermines the
pull of simple rules toward a match between stated purpose and
actual function. As previously explained, 247 refusing to apply a rule
that is intended to favor one class of litigants but is expressed and
implemented in a procedural form, will provide some incentive for
future lawmakers to resist that particular kind of mismatch, bringing
purpose and function into better alignment. Once again, lawmakers
might ignore this pull. Thus, Ama’s lawmakers might choose to
avoid such realignment; nothing about Ama’s purely domestic
litigation would be affected by their doing so. Alternatively, if the

246 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 191-204 (discussing DaimlerChrysler
ERISA case) and notes 221-33 (discussing Melville life insurance case). The enormous
flexibility of the second Restatement’s “primary purpose” escape clause would, of course,
permit a forum court to apply Ama’s affidavit requirement as one intended “to affect the
decision of the issue.” See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. But this flexibility
comes at a considerable cost: it also permits a court to ignore a non-forum state’s allocation
of the ordinary burden of persuasion as one intended “to regulate the conduct of the trial.”
See, e.g., Babcock v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 404 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (relying on the Restatement’s criterion in rejecting the application of the non-forum
state’s allocation rule).
247 See supra text accompanying notes 215-220.
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potential for forum shopping is perceived to be a serious problem,
they can eliminate it by their choice of regulatory tool. This, too,
argues against discretionary escape valves in the choice-of-law rule:
the forum court need only respect the other state’s choice about how
it wants its proof rule to be understood.
Finally, it is important to remember that the use of simple
choice-of- law rules regarding burdens of proof does not preclude
the exercise of substantial judicial discretion in the selection of the
otherwise governing substantive law. Whatever value there is, for
a particular context, in endorsing significant judicial flexibility to
take into account governmental interests is very largely preserved
by the suggested simple rules. Indeed, simple rules regarding the
burdens of proof facilitate the exercise of judicial discretion by
adding clarity to the consequences of the choice of substantive law.
To be sure, even defeasible rules based on the distinction
between the production burden and the persuasion burden would be
a substantial improvement over extant doctrine and, to a lesser
extent, over the results of the extant case law. Still, in horizontal
choice of law, it is time to try simple rules. The instinct toward ad
hoc discretion in choice of law has been strong for decades, and
especially so in those jurisdictions that abandoned the traditional
approach reflected in the first Restatement, but the pendulum rightly
seems to be swinging in the other direction. 248 This particular
context is a good one for the use of simple rules.
VII. A Brief Glance at Other Choice-of-Law Systems
I have argued that the choice-of-law rule, or at least the default
preference, should be that the burden of persuasion on the merits at
trial—as to both its allocation and its severity—follows the rules for
the selected non-forum law, while the burden of production should
follow the law of the forum. 249 If this norm is affirmed in American
horizontal choice of law, how would this relate to other developed
choice-of-law systems? A brief summary is provided here.
In terms of other horizontal choice-of-law frameworks,

248 See SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, at 411-19, 426-37. This shift likely will be
reflected in the Third Restatement: “As envisioned by the Reporters, the Restatement
(Third) will be more rule-oriented than the Restatement (Second).” LITTLE, supra note 45,
at 630.
249 Once again, a different rule would apply to burdens of persuasion not on the merits,
matters that a jury, for example, would not have to resolve. See supra note 17.
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recognition of the suggested norms by American courts would
promote convergence with private international law norms
prevailing, or at least emerging, in the rest of the common-law
world. While many common-law countries also experience the
inertial force of old ideas, such as the right/remedy distinction and
the notion that all burdens of proof must be governed by forum law
because they are procedural, there is growing acceptance of the idea
that burdens of persuasion should be taken together with the lex
causae. 250 On the other hand, regulations of the sufficiency of the
evidence continue to be forum-focused. 251 The connection to the
present thesis is even clearer, however, with regard to codified
European private international law norms. Under both Rome I (for
contractual disputes) and Rome II (for non-contractual disputes),
what American evidence scholars usually call the burden of
persuasion, as well as presumptions that would shift that burden, are
now governed by lex causae rather than lex fori, whereas the various
manifestations of the adversarial concept of the burden of
production are considered too specific to a procedural system for
such selection. 252 Even where these choice-of-law principles are not
mandated, they likely will accelerate the trend in the United
Kingdom and in other non-member common-law countries. 253
Convergence itself promotes the virtues of uniformity of result
and the predictability that this supports. Uniformity of result is
served by the common treatment of rules regulating the burden of

See GARNETT, supra note 3, at 198-99.
See, e.g., DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 216-19 (15th
ed. 2012) (advising that the respective roles of judge and jury are governed by forum law
and that “presumptions of fact”—i.e., what in American jurisprudence are called
permissive inferences—”have no legal effect at all,” which, though false, does have the
happy implication that the question of choosing non-forum law does not arise). To be sure,
much confusion persists in regard to true, rebuttable presumptions. See UGLJEŠA GRUŠIĆ
ET AL., CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Paul Torremans
ed., 15th ed. 2017).
252 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 18,2008
O.J. (L 177/6); Regulation (EC) 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), art. 22,
2007 O.J. (L 199/40); Seibl, supra note 178, at 237-39. For a discussion of a subtlety in
the wording of these rules, which might make the choice depend on characterization under
the lex causae, see GARNETT, supra note 3, at 200.
253 Cf. ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 237-39 (4th ed. 2019).
250
251
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persuasion. 254 And predictability thereby improves from the
perspective of various important participants: for states that want to
anticipate how their proof rules will be regarded by other states; for
litigators who want to anticipate judicial choices; and for the
attorneys who need to prepare multi-jurisdictional contracts.
Uniformity and predictability are, of course, significant conflicts
values. 255 They should become dominant when their attainment
involves practically no risk of disrupting internal policies of each
state and even facilitates international coordination in the
recognition of the policy preferences reflected in burdens of
persuasion.
Horizontal choice of law has been the primary focus of this
Article. But the picture should be completed by a glance at vertical
choice of law in the United States. Parity between horizontal and
vertical choice regimes is not as important because the goals are
different. Nevertheless, some features may be observed. First, to
the extent that the suggested norms are endorsed, horizontal choice
of law in the United States would converge with vertical choice of
law in the treatment of rules regulating the burden of persuasion.
For example, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction would
know that, not only are regulations of the burden of persuasion
governed by state law, but in particular by the law of the state
otherwise supplying the pertinent rules of contract, tort, and so
forth, for the case. Variance between vertical and horizontal choice
of law would continue in regard to rules regulating the burden of
production, at least insofar as some federal courts adhere to the
principle of deferring to state law on such matters. 256 This
dissonance could be largely eliminated if a consistent federal rule
were achieved—whether by the Supreme Court’s or by Congress’s
resolving the split in the circuits—recognizing that the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence should be governed by federal standards
even in diversity jurisdiction cases.
If such a change in federal law were effectuated, the remaining
variance would exist because of a difference between vertical and

254 Of course, a want of uniformity of result (with the associated risk of forum
shopping) is likely in regard to rules regulating the burden of production, but that is
inherent in the reservation of any rules to local control qua procedure, so long as procedural
priorities and associated norms vary across jurisdictions.
255 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (A.L.I. 1971).
256 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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horizontal choice principles in the treatment of presumptions that
shift only the burden of production. Under the proposed norms of
horizontal choice of law, these presumptions would follow forum
law. The vertical choice-of-law question is currently answered by
Rule 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which has the federal
forum defer to state law regarding the effect of presumptions,
whether the presumption in question affects the burden of
persuasion or only the burden of production. 257 This could be
addressed by a clarifying amendment of Rule 302, restricting its
scope to presumptions in state law that alter the burden of
persuasion. 258 There is little reason to think that such a change
would run afoul of Erie. 259
The matter is more complicated in the reverse-Erie context.
Because such cases involve the application of federal law by state
courts, there is an important principle of federal preemption
involved. 260 That principle can require, depending on the particular

257 See FED. R. EVID. 302 (“In a civil case, state law governs the effect of a
presumption regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of
decision.”).
258 Read narrowly, Rule 302 does not answer the question whether to apply a state
presumption; it answers only the question of what “effect” is to be given such a
presumption once such a choice is made. See supra note 257. Theoretically, then, it is open
to the federal courts to hold that only state presumptions that affect the burden of
persuasion are within the scope of the rule. But so far, federal courts do not seem to have
interpreted the Rule this narrowly. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 3:13, 3:14 (4th ed. 2013). To be sure, the decision
of federal courts applying state substantive law to employ related state presumptions
insofar as they affect the burden of production may be explained in terms of simple
convenience, as an implicit judgment of federal procedural policy, without necessarily
invoking the command of Rule 302. If so, a federal court may still choose not to implement
such a state rule. Cf. Richardson v. Matthews, 882 F. Supp. 6 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1995)
(addressing a Massachusetts statutory presumption that regulated both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion; implementing that portion of the Massachusetts
rule that shifted the burden of persuasion; but endorsing the view that uniform federal
standards of evidential sufficiency govern even in diversity cases and thus rejecting that
portion of the state statute that would constrain the federal trial judge’s decision about
whether the evidence was such as to require a jury trial).
259 See generally 21B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5132 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing Supreme Court case law that
acknowledges important federal interests associated with the regulation of the burden of
production and opining that Rule 301 gives greater deference to state law than is
constitutionally necessary).
260 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2006).
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federal law being applied, an application of federal standards of
evidential sufficiency. 261 These norms will preclude complete
convergence with the horizontal choice of law norms here
suggested. Indeed, some states, following the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, have counterparts to federal Rule 302, that defer to
federal law regarding presumptions when federal law otherwise
controls. 262 While it may be convenient to choose to apply federal
presumptions that affect only the burden of production, such state
rules seem unnecessarily broad; they could be amended to remove
presumptions that affect only the burden of production unless
required by federal law. In any event, there is a strain of analysis,
often controversial even among the judiciary, that indicates a desire
for uniformity between federal and state procedures in such cases,
at least so long as that requirement does not necessitate a radical
restructuring of state procedures. 263 Yet, even here—especially
here—the connection between rules governing the burden of
persuasion and the otherwise controlling substantive law clearly

261 Compare, Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949) (reversing state court’s
granting of directed verdict for the defendant in personal injury case arising under Federal
Employers’ Liability Act), with In re Globalsantefe Corp., 275 S.W.3d 477, 479-81 (Tex.
2008) (holding that state’s rules regarding the burden of production—specifically, a
requirement of pretrial affidavit filings with expert findings regarding toxic tort
causation—apply in Jones Act maritime action tried in state court).
262 See, e.g., N.C.R. EVID. 302 (“In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal
law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.”).
263 See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-64
(1952) (holding, 5 to 4, that the federal right to a jury trial on the issue of the validity of a
release of FELA liability applies in state court litigation where, under ordinary state
procedures, such an issue would not be submitted to the jury). The Court balanced the need
for uniformity of result against the burden on the state, and it qualified its holding by
suggesting that the state’s procedure might have survived constitutional scrutiny if it had
abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases. Id. at 363. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the
dissent, emphasizing that the state’s historically-based procedure did not proceed from a
desire to inhibit the enforcement of federal rights, and noted that “it multiplies the
difficulties and confuses the administration of justice to require, on purely theoretical
grounds, a hybrid of State and Federal practice . . . .” Id. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Indeed, he argued (in terms also pertinent to the theory advanced here) that the majority’s
holding was acceptable “only on the theory that Congress included as part of the right
created . . . an assumed likelihood that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to
plaintiffs.” Id. Of course, there is an important difference between the right to a jury trial
per se and the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to warrant trial, whether or not before a
jury.
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prevails. 264
VIII. Conclusion
The subject of horizontal choice of law for burdens of proof
involves a peculiar tension. On the one hand, the case law generally
reflects a pragmatic distinction between regulations of the burden
of persuasion and regulations of the burden of production, with the
former being governed by the otherwise applicable substantive law
and the latter committed to the forum law in service of neutral
procedural goals. On the other hand, one would not infer this from
the language appearing in either of the two Restatements or many
of the judicial opinions they reflect. As drafters work on future
Restatements, they should at least attempt to eliminate this
dissonance by bringing the default choice-of-law principles in line
with the bulk of the case law.
Beyond that, the next Restatement can and should serve a
coordinating function. The adoption of a simple rule—i.e., one
without an escape clause—by one American state would create
greater predictability for other jurisdictions in terms of how those
other jurisdictions want their burden of proof rules to be understood
by the adopting jurisdiction. Obviously, the larger the number of
jurisdictions that adopt such a simple rule, the greater clarity of
message and predictability of impact is provided. By “restating”
(and essentially endorsing) such a rule, a future Restatement can
thus provide a basis for coordination at the interstate and
international level.
There is substantial gain in doing so, and very little loss. On the
positive side, each jurisdiction can anticipate and control how
potential forum jurisdictions will receive its proof burden rules. The
same is true with respect to private parties, such as contracting
parties, who want to anticipate which proof rules will be applied by
a potential forum jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the forum jurisdiction
benefits from a greatly simplified choice-of-law task for burdens of
proof. The forum court need only apply pertinent non-forum
regulations of the burden of persuasion—its allocation or its
severity (standard of proof)—including rules that do so in terms of
presumptions or corroboration requirements.
Regardless of
whether they take the form of permissive inference rules,
presumptions, or corroboration requirements, all other regulations
264

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

2021

CHOICE OF LAW FOR BURDENS OF PROOF

313

of the burden of proof—that is, regulations of the burden of
production—appearing in non-forum rules can be ignored for
choice-of-law purposes. Of course, that does not answer the larger
question about whether to apply the substantive law of the nonforum state. Throughout this Article, I have assumed that the
answer to that question has been resolved in favor of applying the
non-forum law (or that, apart from a difference in proof burdens,
the non-forum law that would be chosen is the same as the forum
law). Yet, the simple rule approach does at least simplify the larger
issue to the extent that it makes clear a part of the non-forum state’s
law that will be incorporated (and a part that will not) in the event
that non-forum law is chosen.
On the negative side is the unusual case when a non-forum
jurisdiction has failed to take advantage of its opportunity to control
how the potential forum jurisdictions will choose, allowing a
mismatch to prevail domestically between the purpose of a proof
rule and its typical function. While this kind of case might be
addressed in the forum by adoption of a default rule subject to an
escape clause, thus allowing the forum court to engage in a search
for purpose in the non-forum proof rule, there is, in the extant case
law, reason to doubt that courts will be able to exercise an escape
clause effectively in order to accurately advance the substantive
policies of non-forum jurisdictions. Moreover, encouraging courts
to undertake such an error-prone inquiry, aside from consuming
judicial resources, undermines the clarity and predictability that
make interstate coordination possible.
The rules regarding burdens of proof turn out to present a good
context for the use of coordination-facilitating norms for choice of
law. Perhaps other rules for which the characterization remains
controversial will also be amenable to such treatment.
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